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Family Separation as a Violation of
International Law*
By
Sonja Starr** & Lea Brilmayer***
Devastating to the individuals involved and frequently destructive in its
long-tenn impact on cultural groups and entire societies, the involuntary separa-
tion of families is a widespread problem that deserves increased attention as an
issue of international human rights. Today, the international legal system is be-
ginning to address the concerns of the family and the need for justice within the
family, and to develop nonns that in many circumstances treat involuntary fam-
ily separation as a violation of international law. Its approach, however, has
been fragmentary and inconsistent, viewing family separation through particular
lenses, such as children's rights or privacy, without establishing a coherent
framework that brings these various perspectives together. In this article, we
identify and compare the emerging principles of international law that relate to
the issue of family separation and elaborate on them in a way that, we hope, will
help to build such a framework.
Our analysis focuses on several case studies, including Australia's long his-
tory of removing Aboriginal children from their parents, recent anti-polygamy
policies in France, current immigration and child welfare laws in the United
States, and mass family separation in crisis situations worldwide. Each of these
varied cases reflects one or more of the many facets of the problem of family
separation, including the cultural significance of the family, the difficulty of
defining "family," the balancing of interests and rights among different mem-
bers of the family, and the balancing of these individuals' rights against the
broader social, political, or economic interests of society or the state. In addi-
tion, each case tests the boundaries of possible international nonns addressing
this problem.
Issues involving the integrity of families are difficult for international law
to resolve because they involve a variety of competing values, values that are
often both passionately held and deeply contested among and within cultures.
These include the rights and interests of individual family members, including
the special rights of children as well as the rights of adults to fonn relationships,
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marry, and raise children. In this article, we address only involuntary family
separation-that is, separation implemented against the expressed will of all the
family members concerned. We do not address, except tangentially, separations
that stem from the active, expressed choice of one or more persons-most nota-
bly from divorce-even though some of the legal principles we discuss may
have implications for, or have been developed largely in the context of, such
situations. Thus, by definition, all the cases of family separation we discuss
interfere with individuals' autonomy, and the question is whether this interfer-
ence is justified. In some cases, the "autonomy" underlying these decisions may
be less than genuine; for example, women who "choose" to enter structurally
oppressive family arrangements may sometimes be so constrained by cultural
pressures or socioeconomic necessity as to lack a meaningful choice. 1
Individual interests often weigh strongly in the direction of keeping fami-
lies together, and they form a central motivation for norms, international or oth-
erwise, in favor of family integrity? In some cases, however, individuals'
interests conflict, or a single individual may have multiple competing interests.
In child welfare cases, for example, the interest of a child in being raised by her
parents, and of that her parents in raising her, must be balanced against her
strong interest in protection from abuse and neglect. Moreover, in addition to
various competing individual interests, involuntary family separation implicates
broader concerns, including core aspects of social structure, culture, and national
identity. As many treaties recognize, the family is a core social institution in
almost all societies, although the nature of families and their social role varies
tremendously. Family separation may therefore threaten the cultural integrity of
peoples. On the other hand, a nation's ability to define what constitutes a family
is often a critical aspect of its collective identity, and may require the separation
of some self-defined families.
Another set of values at stake, particularly important from a feminist per-
spective, are those involving structural equality and justice in the relations
among groups within a society, including but not limited to gender equality.
This perspective places emphasis on the need for justice within the family itself,
which may weigh against protecting certain types of family structure and in
favor of protecting others, and on solutions to the disproportionate impact of
family separation policies on women and ethnic or racial minorities.
Finally, the state also has significant interests in matters involving families.
As a general matter, international regulation of state behavior always implicates
state sovereignty. In addition, other specific state interests, such as the regula-
tion of immigration and the protection of children, are at stake in particular
categories of family separation cases.
It should come as no surprise that international law today fails to provide
any comprehensive or consistent framework for ordering and weighing these
values; indeed, the total lack of consensus on many of these issues may make
1. These issues will be further discussed below, particularly in Section n.B.
2. We use "family integrity" to mean "family unity," and use the two phrases
interchangeably.
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such a framework impossible to achieve. Yet this difficulty should not paralyze
us. International law involves, inevitably, choices and compromises that take
place against a background of cultural difference. Using today's piecemeal in-
ternational regulation of family matters as a starting point, we can begin to iden-
tify principles to help guide these choices in the future. This article examines the
conflicts among these diverse values and interests as they play out in a number
of different case studies, from which we draw some guidance for the develop-
ment of international norms against involuntary family separation. Our primary
focus is on the content of these norms. We leave for another day important
questions regarding the best procedures and institutional arrangements for their
implementation, including whether and when the use of the emerging interna-
tional criminal justice system might be appropriate.
In Section I, we begin with a brief review of the current state of interna-
tional law on this subject, which consists of a patchwork of treaty provisions and
the glimmerings of a developing customary norm against the involuntary separa-
tion of families. The case studies in Section II illustrate the complexity of the
problem and help us to flesh out the parameters of the international norms we
would like to see emerge. In Section II.A, we look at the tragic history of the
Stolen Generations in Australia (and analogous policies in North America)-the
systematic forced removal of tens of thousands of Aboriginal children from their
parents. In Section II.B, we consider the situation of polygamous immigrant
families in France, a longstanding and difficult problem that has recently been
turned on its head by the adoption of rigorous new anti-polygamy laws. Sec-
tions II.C and II.D, which primarily focus on very recent legal changes and court
decisions in the United States, address concerns that are nonetheless significant
every year in countries around the world: family separation issues in immigra-
tion policy and the protective removal of children by social service agencies.
Section II.E considers mass family separation as an aspect of crisis situations,
and particularly examines the obligation of states and international institutions
responding to crises to work toward the reunification of families. We conclude
by assessing the need for new international norms to deal with the growing
problem of involuntary family separation in our fast-changing and conflict-
prone contemporary world.
I.
FAMILY VALUES: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN TODAY'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Section provides an overview of the past, existing, and newly emerg-
ing international legal norms implicating the problem of involuntary family sep-
aration and analyzes these norms in light of the value conflicts discussed in the
Introduction. In Section A, we briefly review the historical evolution of these
norms, addressing the question of how the family became a subject of interna-
tional lawmaking in the first place. In Section B, we review existing treaty
provisions that relate to family separation as well as decisions by the relevant
international bodies interpreting them. In Section C, we consider what potential
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general principles or customary norms we can draw from these treaty provisions
and assess whether strengthening legal protections of the family is justifiable
from a feminist perspective.
A. History
The emergence of principles of international law regarding the family is a
relatively new phenomenon. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
international law addressed families and family law only insofar as it established
choice-of-law principles for cases in national courts involving immigrant fami·
lies or families of mixed nationality? The dominant principle was the notion,
associated with the theorist Pasquale Mancini, that legal disputes relating to an
individual's "personal status"-a concept encompassing marriage and other
family relationships-should be governed by the law of that individual's domi-
cile.4 A number of European and Latin American multilateral conventions codi-
fied this principle and attempted to provide consistent principles for the
determination of domicile; the United States and the United Kingdom did not
join these conventions.s The possibility of reaching an international consensus
on substantive provisions regarding a subject as contentious as the treatment of
the family seemed remote, as even most of the choice-of-law conventions did
not achieve widespread support.6
The middle of the twentieth century saw the development of the first trea-
ties that set forth substantive principles regarding the state's treatment of fami-
lies and, particularly, its protection of children.? The first treaties regarding
child protection dealt with the prohibition of child labor pursuant to the creation
of the International Labor Organization.8 In 1924, the League of Nations passed
a Declaration on the Rights of the Child; this was followed by a similar United
Nations Declaration in 1959.9 These were soft law instruments, not binding on
states. The most significant binding international treaty·to emerge from this era
was the 1961 Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law
Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants. lO The Convention still dealt
largely with choice-of-law issues in guardianship cases; it was notable because it
provided an exception to the prevailing domicile rule when necessary to protect
children. For the first time, a treaty adopted as a central principle the protection
3. See Adair Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 625, 625-
29 (1997).
4. Id. at 626.
5. Id. at 627-28. The U.S. declined to participate in part on the grounds that under its federal
system choice-of-Iaw rules for family law were left up to individual states. Id. at 628. The United
Kingdom also refused participation because it rejected Mancini's domicile-based principle. /d.
6. Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Conventions: The Internationalization of Child Law, in
CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 589,589 (Katz
et al. eds., 2000).
7. Dyer, supra note 3, at 629-30.
8. Id.
9. /d. at 630, 633.
10. Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of
the Protection of Infants, Oct. 5, 1961, 658 U.N.T.S. 143.
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of the "interests of the child," a shift away from earlier conflicts rules that had
been premised solely on the competing rights of parents. II This shift was a
precursor to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which addressed
children's rights far more comprehensively but still in a manner guided by the
"best interests of the child" standard. 12 It was also followed by more recent
Hague Conventions setting forth standards for international cooperation on is-
sues such as child abduction and adoption. 13
The increasing internationalization of law affecting the family represents
the confluence of two significant trends over the past century. First, the tradi-
tional view of the family as belonging to a private sphere insulated from public
scrutiny and regulation, or at least as being a "local" rather than national (much
less international) issue, has become increasingly untenable, if still highly influ-
ential. Feminist scholars have long critiqued this notion, both as a cultural phe-
nomenon 14 and as a legal one. 15 For example, the placement of family issues on
the "local" side of the nationalllocal divide has long been treated by courts as a
central feature of federalism in the United States. Yet Professor Judith Resnik
has shown that this categorization, in addition to perpetuating inequality, has
always been and is increasingly belied by many federal laws that directly or
indirectly affect family affairs. 16 Feminist critiques of the public/private dichot-
omy, and their implications for international legal protections of the family, will
be discussed later in this Section. On an international level, the dichotomy is
increasingly breaking down, as "international law is gradually and reluctantly
moving into unfamiliar areas" such as the regulation of family life to prevent
domestic abuse. 17
Second, the focus of international law has shifted from relations among
nation-states toward the protection of individual rightS. 18 The mid- to late twen-
tieth century saw the development of a number of other major human rights
treaties, both global and regional. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
11. Dyer, supra note 3, at 633. The effect of this treaty was limited, however, by the fact that
only eleven states (all civil law countries) ratified it. See Karin Wolfe, Note, A Tale of Two States:
Successes and Failures of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abductions in the United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 285, 293 & n.24 (2000).
The treaty has now been superceded by a subsequent Hague Convention passed in 1996. See Adair
Dyer, Keynote Address: To Celebrate a Score of Years. 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1,4 n. 13
(2000); see also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
12. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49 at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter CRC]; see, e.g., id. art. 3 (setting forth
the "best interests of the child" standard).
13. See Silberman, supra note 6, at 589 (discussing these conventions).
14. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-133 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619 (2001) (critiquing American law's traditional characterization of family matters as
"local," and of gender violence as belonging to the category of family matters).
16. Id.
17. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 72
(1995).
18. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, Part II (Introductory Note)
(1987); Bartram S. Brown, International Law: The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating
States: A New Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 203, 214 (1992) (describing a "fundamental shift
away from the old state-centric international law").
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set the stage for the postwar expansion of human rights law. 19 The Universal
Declaration is not a treaty; it was originally intended to be a hortatory set of
standards, not binding law. However, many of its provisions are now accepted
as customary international law?O Probably the most significant human rights
treaty today, in terms of its scope and number of signatories, is the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR), which entered into force
in 1976.21 In addition to the wide-ranging protections of the Universal Declara-
tion and ICCPR, a number of treaties specifically address particular categories
of human rights abuses-for example, sex discrimination,22 race discrimina-
tion,23 and genocide?4 Finally, three regional human rights conventions for Eu-
rope, the Americas, and Africa entered into force in 1953, 1978, and 1986,
respectively?S Each of these treaties contains specific provisions affecting fam-
ilies and has implications for the development of an international norm against
involuntary family separation. These will be discussed further in the next
Section.
B. Family Separation Under Current International Law: Treaty Provisions
In this Section, we review a variety of different treaty provisions suggesting
that current international law contains norms against involuntary family separa-
tion. We divide these provisions loosely into five categories. The first four
consist of protections of individual rights: the individual right to familial pri-
vacy, children's rights, parental rights, and the right to marry. The final cate-
gory consists of provisions that protect the family as an institution. This
protection may be framed as a right of the family or as an obligation of the state.
Note that the individual rights provisions do not encompass the full range of
individual family relationships one might imagine; no international treaty specif-
ically protects the rights of siblings to stay together, for example, nor grandpar-
ents' rights. International law protects such rights to some extent through
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. Doc. N810 at 71
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
20. See W. Michael Reisman, Comment: Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPRI.
22. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249
U.N.T.S. 20378 (1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
23. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter
CERDI.
24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78
U.N.T.S. 1021 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
25. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 Dec. 1953) [hereinafter European Convention];
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force Jul.
18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]; African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
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general provisions protecting privacy and family life; some court decisions on
this point are discussed below.26
This section is not a comprehensive review of existing treaty provisions
that have implications for the legality of particular instances of family separa-
tion. A number of additional provisions affect the application of this norm to
specific circumstances-for example, where family separation is used as a tool
of genocide, it may violate the Genocide Convention, while policies that restrict
family members' rights to travel in order to visit one another may violate provi-
sions protecting the freedom of movement. The African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights has held that family separation under certain circumstances
violates provisions against inhuman and degrading treatment.27 A range of spe-
cific provisions will be discussed in Section II in the context of particular case
studies. Also, in addition to international provisions against family separation,
some treaty provisions may weigh in favor of family separation in particular
circumstances. For example, provisions obligating the state to act to prevent
child abuse, which are discussed to a limited extent in Subsection 2 below,
sometimes necessitate a child's removal from her parents, while provisions in
favor of gender equality may arguably weigh in favor of the anti-polygamy poli-
cies discussed in Section II.B. Both of these other categories of treaty provi-
sions will be considered in the context of the case studies in Section II. This
Section, however, simply reviews the possible treaty-based arguments in favor
of a norm against involuntary family separation, considering them against the
background of the value conflicts discussed in the Introduction and using them
to provide a broader context for the subsequent discussion of the case studies.
1. The Right to Privacy and Family Life
The right to family integrity is an aspect of the right to privacy, which is
protected by a number of international conventions. Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honour or reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.,,28 Very similar language is found in
Article 17 of the ICCPR,29 Article 11 of the American Convention,30 Article 16
26. See also VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 83 (discussing siblings' rights). Note that Article
5 of the CRC imposes a general obligation on sates to respect, "where applicable," the rights of the
extended family. See infra note 48.
27. Modise v. Botswana, African Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rights, Comrn. No. 97/93
(1997).
28. Universal Declaration, supra note 19, art. 12.
29. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 17.
30. American Convention, supra note 25, art. II. The American Convention's structure is
somewhat different. Headed "Right to Privacy," Article II reads: "I. Everyone has the right to have
his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks
on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." [d.
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of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,31 and Article 10 of the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.32 In each of these treaties,
arbitrariness is the touchstone for what counts as unlawful interference with the
family. Article 8 of the European Convention provides similar protection, al-
though, instead of using the term "arbitrary," it spells out the conditions under
which the state may interfere with family life:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?3
Among the various international human rights institutions, the European
system has produced the most developed family privacy doctrine; we will take a
closer look at it here. Notwithstanding the potentially broad scope of the excep-
tions in section 2, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted
Article 8 to provide fairly robust privacy protection generally, and specifically to
protect family integrity against state interference. The right to cohabitate with
one's family has been held to be a central aspect of "family life" under Article 8
(as well as a core element of the Article 12 right to "found a family")?4 The
Court has held that Article 8 places restrictions and obligations on states in areas
including child custody decisions,35 protective removal of children,36 immigra-
tion policy,37 and illegitimacy laws.38 Many of these decisions will be dis-
cussed in subsequent sections of this article; we set forth some of the basic
principles here.
In Marckx v. Belgium, which held that Article 8 forbids states from legally
discriminating against illegitimate children, the ECHR set forth the principle
that Article 8 does not simply impose negative restrictions on the state's author-
ity to interfere with family life. Rather, "there may be positive obligations in-
herent in an effective 'respect' for family life.... [The State] must act in a
manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life.,,39
This obligation encompasses the creation of domestic "legal safeguards that
31. CRC, supra note 12, art. 16 (granting these privacy rights specifically to children).
32. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July, 1990 OAU Doc. CABILEG/
24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter African Children's Charter] (protect-
ing the privacy of the child). Note that the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in
contrast, does not contain privacy protections. See African Charter, supra note 25.
33. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 8.
34. Abdu1aziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, 7 H.R. Rep. 471, 'lI
62 (1985).
35. E.g., Hoffman v. Austria, App. No. 12875/87, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293 (1993); Sa1gueiro da
Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1055 (1999).
36. E.g., Olsson v. Sweden, App. No. 10465/83, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 259 (1987); see also notes
369-380 and accompanying text
37. E.g., Abdulaziz, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471; Ciliz v. Netherlands, 2000-Vill Eur. Ct. H.R. 267.
38. E.g., Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833n4, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330 (1979); Johnston v.
Ireland, App. No. 9697/82, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 203, 'lI'lI 70-75 (1986).
39. Marcia:, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330'lI 31.
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render possible, as from the moment of birth, the child's integration in his fam-
ily.,,4o The principle that the state may be required to affirmatively promote
family life is repeated, if not extensively developed, in a number of other
cases.41 However, the Court has held that these positive obligations are particu-
larly culturally contingent and that states are entitled to considerable discretion
in carrying them OUt.42
The ECHR has often added strength to Article 8's protections by reading
them in conjunction with the Article 14 prohibition on discrimination. For ex-
ample, in Mouta v. Portugal, the Court read Articles 8 together with 14 to pre-
vent states from discriminating in child custody decisions against homosexual
parents.43 In Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, it found that an immigration policy
that allowed admission to the spouses of male but not female legal residents
discriminated on the basis of sex, violating Article 14 in conjunction with Arti-
cle 8.44 Similarly, in Markcx the Court cited the non-discrimination imperative
embodied by Article 14 when it held that "Article 8 makes no distinction be-
tween the 'legitimate' and the 'illegitimate' family."45 In this regard, it also
noted that Council of Europe resolutions had established that families headed by
single mothers are entitled to be treated as no less of a "family" than traditional
two-parent families.46 In rejecting the Belgian government's defense that its
illegitimacy policy was necessary to protect "morals and public order," the
Court agreed that "support and encouragement of the traditional family is in
itself legitimate or even praiseworthy," but held that measures toward this end
must not prejudice the rights of other families.47 The Court also held that Arti-
cle 8 protects not only the rights of immediate family members, but also those of
grandparents and other extended family members.48
Yet the ECHR's cases also reflect ambivalence about the power of interna-
tionallaw to restrict states' ability to control the legal and practical definition of
a family. For example, in Rees v. United Kingdom, the Court held that the Arti-
cle 8 privacy right did not encompass a right of a post-operative transsexual to
have his new sex identity legally recognized so that he could marry a woman. It
reasoned that "the notion of 'respect' is not clear-cut. ... [H]aving regard to the
diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Con-
tracting States, the notion's requirements will vary considerably from case to
40. [d.
41. E.g., Abdulaziz, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471 '1167; Ciliz, 2000-VIlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 267 'Il'Il61-62.
42. See Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 'Il'Il35-37 (1986) (noling that the scope
of the positive obligations entailed by Article 8 is indetenninate, will vary from state to state based
on cultural practices, and will depend on a "fair balance" between community and individual
interests).
43. 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1055 'i 36.
44. 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471 '1183.
45. 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330 'II 31.
46. [d.
47. [d. '1140.
48. /d. 'II 45. Note that the extended family is also protected under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the drafting history of which reflects particular concern for the accommodation
of cultural difference. See SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVEN-
TION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 335 (1999); see also supra note 26.
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case.,,49 Thus, although acknowledging that a number of European states did
afford transsexuals the legal right at issue, the Court refused to require the U.K.
to follow this example, instead allowing it to resolve such critical issues of iden-
tity on its own.50 The Court has also emphasized the evolution of social and
cultural norms, as reflected by state practice across Europe; sometimes, as in the
illegitimacy cases, this has served to justify the recognition of a new Article 8
right.51 In other cases, like Rees, the Court has left open the possibility of fur-
ther evolution that might change the law in the future, but has found that thus far
the necessary state practice element for the establishment of a particular norm is
lacking.52 .
2. The Rights of the Child and the "Best Interests" Test
The second category of relevant treaty provisions are those that protect the
rights of children to remain with their families. As described above, a series of
international treaties and declarations, culminating in the 1989 Convention on
the Rights of the Child, has established the "best interests of the child" as the
general standard states must employ to shape their policies and practices affect-
ing children.53 A number of specific provisions of the Convention reflect a
presumption that family unity will best serve these interests. First, the Preamble
to the Convention describes the family as the "natural environment for the
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children," and further
states that "the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happi-
ness, love and understanding."54 More specifically, Article 7(1) of the Conven-
tion grants each child "as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents,,,55 while Article 8(1) grants the "right of the child to preserve
his or her identity, including ... family relations ... without unlawful interfer-
ence.,,56 Article 9(1) specifically bans the separation of children from their par-
ents except under specific circumstances:
State Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation
is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be neces-
sary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the
parents, or one where the parents are livil!f separately and a decision must be
made as to the child's place of residence.5
49. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56'11 37.
50. [d. '11'II 37, 42.
51. See Marcia:, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330 '1141.
52. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56'11'II 37, 47.
53. This standard, and particularly its application to the protective removal of children by
social welfare services, will be discussed extensively in Section n.D below.
54. CRC, supra note 12, Preamble 'II 6.
55. [d. art. 7(1).
56. [d. art. 8(1).
57. [d. art. 9(1).
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Note that while Article 9(1) allows states to remove children from their
families in order to protect them from abuse or neglect, it imposes a procedural
requirement of judicial review-a protection lacking in many states, as dis-
cussed below in Section II.D. Although the Convention does not make clear
whether this judicial review must take place before the child is removed, Article
9(1) is commonly interpreted as imposing such a requirement,58 Article 9(2)
further specifies that "all interested parties" shall have a right to participate in
proceedings pursuant to Article 9(1). This procedural right "has been compared
with Article 14(1) of the ICCPR," a provision generally outlining due process
protections for any individual whose legally protected rights are at stake.59
Article 24(1) of the ICCPR grants children the right to special protection by
the state. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has held that this right affirma-
tively obligates the state to intervene in situations where a child faces abuse or
neglect,6o A similar requirement of special protection for children is provided
by Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights.61
The Convention on the Rights of the Child also imposes obligations on
states in situations where families have already been separated. First, where
children are separated from one or both parents (for example, due to child cus-
tody decisions as described in Article 9(1)), the state must respect a child's right
to "maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.,,62 Furthermore, if
parents are separated from their children due to "any action initiated by a State
Party, such as ... detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation, or death," the
state must furnish the parents or children with any available information regard-
ing their family members' whereabouts.63 Finally, where national borders sepa-
rate children from their parents, states must allow sufficient freedom of
movement to enable the families to see one another regularly.64 They also must
handle applications by children or parents "to enter or leave a State Party for the
purpose of family reunification" in a "positive, humane, and expeditious man-
ner.,,65 One scholar has noted that this constitutes an "innovative obligation"
58. Stales that allow only ex post facto review by their courts have submitted reservations to
this portion of the Convention. See DETRICK, supra note 48, al 171-72.
59. [d. at 174.
60. [d. at 173 (citing the Committee's General Commenls).
61. [d.
62. CRC, supra note 12, art. 9(4).
63. [d. art. 9(3).
64. [d. art. 10(2).
65. [d. art. 10(1). Article 10 stops short of requiring that states permit immigration for the
purpose of family reunification, however. Furthermore, it may not even require that states admit
alien parents or children for visits. Although Article 10(2) grants children whose parents reside in
different countries the right to maintain "personal relations and direct contacts with both parents," it
goes on to state: ''Towards that end ... States Parties shall respect the righl of the child and his or
her parents to leave any country, including their own, and to enter their own country." This last
clause does not give children or parents the right to enter any foreign country-which raises the
question of how a parent and child of different nalionalities could visit one another if neither of the
states in question was willing to admit the one who was an alien.
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under international law, arguably giving rise to a right to enter a foreign country
(subject to exclusion based on certain specific justifications), a right that other
international conventions have not afforded.66 Ordinarily, states have not had to
justify the exclusion of aliens under international law. Subject to certain limita-
tions such as non-discrimination, control of immigration has always been
viewed as a sovereign right. This principle and its limits are discussed further in
Sections II.B and C.
Another treaty that extensively details the human rights of children is the
1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which entered into
force in 1999.67 Like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this Charter
employs the "best interests of the child" standard.68 Subject only to this stan-
dard, it prohibits the separation of children from their parents. Article 19 states:
1. Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of parental care and protection
and shall, whenever possible, have the right to reside with his or her parents. No
child shall be separated from his parents against his will, except when a judicial
authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation
is in the best interest of the child.
2. Every child who is separated from one or both parents shall have the right to
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis....
Furthermore, the Charter requires that states share information and otherwise
facilitate reunification where families have been separated.69 It also imposes
detailed requirements for care of children and family reunification efforts in the
event of armed conflict and refugee situations, and limits the conditions under
which mothers (but not fathers) may be separated from their children due to
imprisonment.70 These reunification provisions, which have precursors in the
Geneva Conventions,71 demonstrate how the specific rights of the child pro-
tected by these treaties build on other, more generally applicable human rights.
For example, one scholar has noted that the "right of the~hild to reunification
In fact, Article 10(2) may not provide any significant protection beyond that already provided
by other principles of international law. The rights to leave any country and to enter one's own are
basic human rights that are not contingent on the need for family unification. See, e.g., Universal
Declaration, supra note 19, art. 13(2). But the protections of freedom of movement were controver-
sial at the time of drafting, however elementary they seem now, because the Convention was drafted
during the Cold War, when many Soviet bloc countries did not permit their citizens to leave freely.
See DETRICK, supra note 48, at 185-86. In addition, it is possible that the general "right" set forth in
the first sentence of CRC Article 10(2) reaches beyond the specific obligations imposed by the
remaining sentences, which may not alone be enough to realize that right.
66. DETRICK, supra note 48, at 189. But see id. at 190 (noting that the travaux preparatoires
of the CRC stated that Article 10 did not interfere with "the general right of States to establish and
regulate their respective immigration laws in accordance with their international obligations," al-
though these international obligations might, in a circular fashion, include the specific requirements
of Article 10 itself).
67. African Children's Charter, supra note 32.
68. [d. art. 4(1).
69. [d. art. 19(3).
70. [d. arts. 22, 23, 30.
71. See DETRICK, supra note 48, at 179.
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with his or her family has developed from two fundamental rights: the right to
respect for family life and the right to freedom of movement."n
The principle of the "best interests of the child," which originally derived
from U.S. family law, is today a ubiquitous feature of international treaties and
the reasoning of international institutions. In addition to its prominence in the
specific treaties addressing the rights of children, the "best interests" principle
has been the basis for decisions and comments of the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mittee interpreting provisions of the ICCPR and its optional protocols,73 as well
as for decisions by the ECHR.74 Yet despite the consensus this standard enjoys,
its meaning is highly contested, and it has been criticized for vagueness. "Best
interests" may be given "very diverse interpretations" depending on the cultural
context.75 The evolution and application of the best interests of the child stan-
dard will be discussed further in the case studies, particularly Section II.D,
which focuses on the protective removal of children from their parents.
3. Parental Rights
In addition to protecting the rights of children to be with their parents,
international law also protects the rights of parents to be with and care for their
children. Parental rights are, in fact, extensively recognized by the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and may modify the "best interests" standard. Article
3 states:
1. In all actions concerning children ... the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his
h 76or er parents. . . .
The wording of Article 3 suggests that protection of parental rights may permit
some departures from the strict application of the best interests standard. The
best interests of the child are only required to be a primary consideration, not
necessarily the dispositive consideration, and Article 3(2) seems to suggest that
parental rights need to be balanced against any contrary interests of the child.
Indeed, the drafting history of the Convention shows that the choice of language
was quite deliberate; an earlier proposal to define the child's best interests as
72. VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 105; cf supra note 65.
73. See General Comment No. 17(35), Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, 'l! 6, U.N. Doc. N44/40 (1989); General Comment No. 19(39),
Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 175 U.N. Doc. N
CONF. 157/24 (Part I) (1993); Hendriks v. Netherlands, App. No. 8427/78, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Recs. (1982); Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation ofCul-
ture and Human Rights, 8 OO'L J.L. & FAM. I, 4 (1994) (collecting these cases).
74. See infra notes 369-380 and accompanying text.
75. Alston, supra note 73, at 4-5; see also id. at 10-11 (criticizing the drafters for giving too
little attention to the meaning of "best interests"); id. at 18 (noting that "best interests" is a particu-
larly indeterminate standard even when compared to other international human rights norms); cf
Abdullah An-Na'im, Cultural Transformation and Normative Consensus on the Best Interest of the
Child, 8 OO'L J.L. & FAM. 62, 63 (1994) (noting that the CRC in general may represent "much
apparent consensus on very little substance").
76. CRC, supra note 12, art. 3.
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"the paramount consideration" was rejected.77 This suggests that international
law recognizes a strong parental right to family unity that must be considered,
even where a child's interests lean toward removal from his or her parents.
In Article 18, which obligates the state to provide parents with appropriate
assistance in child care, the Convention states, "Parents or, as the case may be,
legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and develop-
ment of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.,,78
This provision not only recognizes parental rights to care for children, but also
sets forth the presumption that the exercise of those rights will be in the best
interests of children. Furthermore, the Convention recognizes specific rights of
parents in a number of other provisions: the right to guide children in the exer-
cise of their own rights, the right to state-provided information and reunification
efforts in the event of separation, and the right to travel across national borders
to visit children.
Several other treaties recognize the right of parents to care for their chil-
dren. The Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the European and American
Conventions all recognize the right of all persons to "found" or "raise a fam-
ily."79 The Mrican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child both recog-
nizes parents' "primary responsibility ... [for] the upbringing and development
[of] the child" and imposes upon them individual duties regarding the exercise
of that responsibility.8o In addition, carving out an exception to children's pri-
vacy rights, it states that "parents or legal guardians shall have the right to exer-
cise reasonable supervision over the conduct of their children.,,81 The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) mandates that states accord parental rights equally to men and wo-
men, although not necessarily mandating that such rights exist in the first
place.82 In addition, the ICCPR recognizes parents' right to control their chil-
dren's religious and moral education-a right that could not be exercised in the
event of family separation.83
4. The Right to Marry
The fourth type of international law provision affecting family unity is the
protection of the right to marry. This right was set forth in Article 16(1) of the
Universal Declaration, which states: "Men and women of full age, without any
limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage
77. See Alston, supra note 73, at 10, 12. In many domestic legal systems, the best interest of
the child is treated as paramount, in contrast to the international standard. See Stephen Parker, The
Best Interests of the Child: Principles and Problems, 8 INr'L J.L. & FAM. 26, 27 (1994).
78. CRC, supra note 12, art. 18(1).
79. Universal Declaration, supra note 19, art. 16(1); ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 23(2); Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 25, art. 12; American Convention, supra note 25, art. 17(2).
80. African Children's Charter, supra note 32, art. 20.
8!. Id. art. 10.
82. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 16.1 (d).
83. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 18(4).
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and at its dissolution." The ICCPR and the American and European Conven-
tions all protect the "right of men and women of marriageable age to marry.,,84
Like the Universal Declaration, the American Convention also specifies that
states may not limit the right to marry on discriminatory grounds.85 CEDAW
requires that marriage rights (including the rights to freely consent to and to
terminate marriages) be available equally to men and to women.86
The ECHR has adopted a fairly narrow interpretation of the right to marry
in the European Convention. For example, the Court has held that Article 12
does not provide a right to same-sex marriage, an issue discussed further in
Section II.B.8? Subsequently, although the Court held that three-year restric-
tions on remarriage violate Article 12, it suggested unwillingness to judge do-
mestic marriage law by international standards. The Court stated that the fact
that "a country finds itself in an isolated position as regards one aspect of its
legislation does not necessarily imply that that aspect offends the Convention,
particularly in a field-matrimony-which is so closely bound up with the cul-
tural and historical traditions of each society and its deep-rooted ideas about the
family unit.,,88 Thus, even strong evidence of predominant state practice sup-
porting the existence of an international norm will not, in the realm of marriage,
necessarily provide a basis for rejecting the particular policy choices of states.
The Court has also held that Article 12 only protects the initial act of mar-
riage, but does not implicate individuals' rights thereafter.89 Thus, the Conven-
tion does not protect the right to divorce,9o although it may protect the right to
physical separation and does protect the right of persons to remarry once they
are legally divorced.91 Similarly, one might infer from this narrow construction
that Article 12 does not prevent states from forcing already-married couples to
separate, and that such a restriction, if found in the Convention at all, must be
grounded in Article 8's protection of family life or some other provision.
Interestingly, the ECHR has specifically distinguished Article 12 in this
regard from Article 16 of the Universal Declaration, on which it was based; the
drafters of the European Convention dropped the Declaration's language ex-
tending equal rights to men and women "during marriage and at its dissolu-
tion.,,92 Although the Declaration's language may appear only to ban sex
discrimination in marriage rights, the ECHR's citation to it in a case unrelated to
sex discrimination suggests that the Court may have read the Declaration to
provide all people with a right to maintain or dissolve a marriage. Thus, to the
84. [d. art. 23(2); see also European Convention, supra note 25, art. 12 (using similar but not
identical language); American Convention, supra note 25, art. 17(2).
85. American Convention, supra note 25, art. 17(2) (stating that slates may impose conditions
on marriages "insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of nondiscrimination established
in this convention").
86. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 16(1).
87. See Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 'II 50.
88. F. v. Switzerland, App. No. 11329/85, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 411 'II 33 (1987).
89. E.g., Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 203 '1152 (1986).
90. [d. 'II 54.
91. F. v. Switzerland, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 411.
92. Johnston, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 203 'll 52.
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extent that the Declaration is binding as customary international law, it may
offer protection beyond that provided by the European Convention.
The Human Rights Committee has held that the right to "marry and found a
family," which is protected by Article 23(2) of the ICCPR, encompasses the
right to procreate and to live together with one's family.93 This holding implies
that the right to marry and found a family under the ICCPR extends beyond the
initial act of marriage and procreation-the state cannot force already-married
couples to separate from one another or from their children. Furthermore, the
right to marry may impose affirmative obligations on the state to take necessary
measures to ensure family reunification when, for whatever reason, families are
separated between or within states.94
5. The "Fundamental Group Unit": The Rights of the Family
The final category of relevant treaty provisions consists of those that seek
to protect the family unit, as opposed to the rights of individuals to remain with
their families. These provisions focus on the family as an institution and its
relationship to society as a whole. The prototype is Article 16(3) of the Univer-
sal Declaration, which states: "The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.,,95 Article
23(1) of the ICCPR and Article 17(1) of the American Convention contain the
same language, and the Preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
similarly describes the family as the "fundamental group of society.,,96 Article
18 of the African Charter goes into further detail regarding the family's cultural
role and the state's obligations:
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected
by the State which shall take care of its physical health and morals.
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of
morals and traditional values recognized by the community.97
The Charter, which is the only major human rights treaty to assign individuals a
set of duties toward society, goes on to require individuals to respect their par-
ents, "preserve the harmonious development of the family," and work for its
"cohesion and respect.,,98 In addition, a number of treaty provisions and soft
law instruments require the state to provide affirmative protection to the fam-
ily.99 As international family law scholar Geraldine Van Bueren has noted, fi-
93. See DETRICK, supra note 48, at 187.
94. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19, 39th Sess. at 29, U.N. Doc. HRIlGEN/I,
(1990).
95. Universal Declaration, supra note 19, art. 16(3).
96. ICCPR, supra note 21, art 23(1); American Convention, supra note 25, art. 17(1); CRC,
supra note 12, preamble.
97. African Charter, supra note 25, art. 18(1)(2).
98. [d. art. 29. See also African Children's Charter, supra note 32, art. 18 (stating that the
family, as the "natural unit and basis of society ... shall enjoy the protection and support of the
State).
99. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 77 (citing provisions of the CRC, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Declaration on Social Progress and
Development, as well as statements of the Committee of Independent Experts, which was estab-
lished pursuant to the European Social Charter).
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nancial or other assistance from the state may be "the most effective measure to
ensure the unity of the family as the basic unit in society."lOo
Provisions such as these point to an "essential dichotomy surrounding the
family," which international law constructs both as a collection of individuals
with competing interests and as a group that is protected as such. 101 The lan-
guage in many of these treaty provisions emphasizing the family's place in soci-
ety suggests that the provisions protect the family not as a holder of a group
right but rather as a cultural institution. Such a reading is also supported by the
fact that no procedural mechanisms exist to enforce protection of the "rights" of
the family unit under the European and American conventions, nor under the
ICCPR. 102 In practice, then, these provisions protect broader societal interests
rather than the interests of the family per se; they are a means of cultural preser-
vation. Not surprisingly, then, interpretations of these provisions have afforded
a wide degree of cultural latitude. The Human Rights Committee has inter-
preted Article 17 of the ICCPR to mean that a society's obligation to protect the
family "may vary from country to country and depend on different social, eco-
nomic, political or cultural conditions and traditions.,,103 Indeed, the Committee
has also held that the very definition of the family may vary considerably from
society to society. 104 As a general rule, "both international and regional human
rights law are slowly corning to terms with the different cultural approaches to
the concept of family."105
C. Customary Norms Against Family Separation
All of these categories of provisions, and their application by the relevant
treaty bodies, demonstrate that international law now recognizes a number of
principles that, at least under certain circumstances, protect the integrity of fami-
lies. We argue that the various conventions may also be giving rise to a nascent
broader norm of customary international law. Customary international law,
which binds all states,106 derives from two elements: state practice and opinio
juris. The former refers to what states do and the latter to why they do it, that is,
to a prevailing belief that certain behavior is either required or prohibited by
international law. 107 Professor Anthea Roberts has described a recent shift in
the weight of these elements in the process of forming customary law. Tradi-
tionally, the state practice element was paramount, while the opinio juris ele-
ment posed the subsidiary question of why certain state practices existed. The
100. Id.
101. Id. al 68.
102. Id. at 78 (noting that the "entitlement of the family to protection by society and the state is
fonnulated as a group right, but the basic procedural hurdles only allow for individual claims").
103. See id. (quoting the HRC's decision in Cziffra and Nineteen Mauritius Women).
104. See id. (noting that the HRC "accepts that there is not a singly universally binding defini-
tion of family" and interprets Article 17 to encompass all those groups that would comprise the
family "in the society of the State Party concerned").
105. /d. at 71.
106. See Alston, supra note 73, at 17.
107. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary Interna-
tional Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. lNT'L L. 757, 757-58 (2001).
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"modern" view, however, has placed primary weight on the opinio juris ele-
ment, which may be inferred from court decisions, declarations of international
forums, and the content of treaties that have been ratified by a large number of
states. 108 The modern approach allows norms to evolve more quickly, because
international legal opinion changes more easily than does state practice. 109
Without taking up the question of the comparative legitimacy of these ap-
proaches, we will by necessity analyze the existence of customary norms largely
from the modern perspective; we simply lack sufficiently comprehensive infor-
mation as to the practice of large numbers of states. In any case, our main
objective is to explore the directions in which we think customary and treaty-
based international law ought to evolve, rather than simply describing its current
content.
It is probably too early to argue that a general norm against family separa-
tion has achieved the status of customary international law-at least, to the ex-
tent that that norm would extend beyond the specific aspects and circumstances
discussed here. Given the widespread occurrence of family separation, the state
practice element is probably lacking. Furthermore, few sources of international
opinion have addressed this problem in any kind of comprehensive manner. We
believe, however, that such a norm is beginning to evolve in fragmentary ways.
Sufficient consensus exists against particular types of family separation, or in
favor of some of the specific principles discussed above that weigh against fam-
ily separation, to constitute customary international law. 11O Moreover, we be-
lieve that customary norms will continue to evolve as international and domestic
institutions apply the relevant treaty provisions and engage in dialogue regarding
their meanings and implications. III The piecemeal treaty provisions discussed
in this Section may increasingly come to be seen to embody an underlying gen-
eral norm. For example, as Professor Sharon Detrick has stated, Articles 9( 1)
and 10(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child "embody the principle of
family unity, as they share the aim of protecting children against separation from
their parents." I 12 More to the point, these norms should continue to evolve. The
case studies discussed in this article give just a few examples of the magnitude
of the problem of family separation and the variety of its forms, which suggest
that the issue cannot be addressed adequately by narrowly tailored treaty provi-
108. Id. at 758-59. Professor Roberts also describes a sharp schism among international legal
scholars regarding the acceptability of these two approaches and provides a theory that aims to
reconcile the two.
109. Id.
110. See. e.g., April Adell, Note, Fear of Persecution for Opposition to Violations of the Inter-
national Human Right to Found a Family as a Legal Entitlement to Asylumfor Chinese Refugees, 24
HOFSTRA L. REv. 789, 795-96 (1996) (arguing that the right to found a family has achieved the
status of customary international law).
II I. See. e.g., An-Na'im, supra note 75, at 64 (noting that continued international dialogue will
produce increasing consensus on the "meaning and implications" of the best interests principle).
The best interests principle itself probably enjoys the status of customary international law already.
See discussion, infra notes 311-320 and accompanying text, of the Beharry v. Reno case in the
United States, which held the provisions of the CRC binding on the non-signatory United States as
customary international law.
112. DETRICK, supra note 48, at 191.
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sions. The remainder of this article is devoted to the exploration of the possible
contours of new international norms against involuntary family separation.
First, however, we anticipate one significant objection, grounded in femi-
nist theory and experience, to the recognition of international norms against
family separation. Many critics have argued that notions such as family rights
and family privacy simply insulate from scrutiny, and thereby ensure the contin-
uation of, violence and oppression within families. Professor Fernando Teson
provides one version of this argument:
[I now tum to] one of modem feminism's most persuasive points: the modem
state affords excessive protection to the family. Family "autonomy," as the legal
basis of the private social domain, has legitimized the domination of women and
children by men. . . . The law should punish the victimization of women, and
culprits should not be allowed to hide behind the "family unit," a politically de-
fined space where men may unjustly dominate and sometimes even victimize wo-
men and children.... [G]roup autonomy (state sovereignty, family autonomy) is
an illiberal notion. Kantian liberalism insists that our moral principles derive
from individual dignity and autonomy. Every person holds individual rights
which are not forfeited by membership in the group. . . . Just as the principle of
state sovereignty must be set aside to protect citizens whose rights are violated by
their government, so the principle of family autonomy must be set aside to protect
the rights of members of the family.l13
Professor Teson's argument is a liberal version of the critique, extensively
developed by feminist scholars over several decades, of the relegation of women
to the private sphere. Some feminists go further, arguing that the public/private
dichotomy itself institutionalizes oppression and violence. 114 Many contempo-
rary international legal scholars argue that international law should increasingly
focus on affairs of the family-not in order to increase the legal protection of-
fered to the family as a unit, but rather in order to protect the individual rights of
family members and/or to break down social structures of subordination. 1 IS As
it stands now, international law places excessive weight on state sovereignty and
imposes insufficient duties on states to protect human rights within the family.
The result, in Professor Teson's words, is that "there are two layers of legal
immunity enjoyed by men who oppress women: domestic law, which treats the
family as the man's castle, and international law, which likewise leaves the state
(with its many men's castles) largely shielded from external scrutiny."u6
Those obligations that international law does place on states with respect to
their treatment of families may simply perpetuate oppression. As feminist
scholars Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright have ar-
gued, treaty provisions protecting the "natural and fundamental group unit of
society . . . ignore that to many women, the family is a unit for abuse and
113. Fernando R. Teson, Feminism and International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 647,
657-58 (1993).
114. E.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Chrisline Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AJ.I.L. 613, 636-37 (1991).
115. See, e.g., Teson, supra note 113 (making the individual rights-based argument); see gener-
ally Charlesworth et aI., supra note 114 (critiquing both the traditional model of international law
and the rights-based alternative of liberal feminism for perpetuating structures of oppression).
116. Teson, supra note 113, at 658.
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violence; hence, protection of the family also preserves the power structure
within the family, which can lead to subjugation and dominance by men over
women and children." 117 Furthermore, some contend that treaty provisions that
link privacy rights to the protection of the family (such as Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention) reinforce the role of the public/private dichotomy in interna-
tional law. 118
We do not know what any of these scholars would have to say specifically
about international norms dealing with involuntary family separation. However,
we imagine that some might argue that any legal norm, international or other-
wise, that seeks to protect the family qua family risks strengthening the publici
private divide and setting up further barriers to legal remedies for intra-family
oppression. This is especially true when such norms depend on the right to
privacy or the value of the "family unit," whether conceived as a matter of
"group autonomy" or as a social institution.
Weare sympathetic to these criticisms, and we wish at this point to make
clear what we are not arguing when we argue for international norms against
family separation. First, we are only addressing involuntary family separation-
that is, separation enforced against the expressed wishes of all family members.
We do not argue in favor of an international norm that would prevent individu-
als from leaving oppressive family structures voluntarily; indeed, we believe
international law should protect their right to do SO.1I9 Second, we are not by
any means arguing that family unity is a value that should trump all others, or
that it should in general take precedence over individual rights or social equality
concerns. Indeed, a central aspect of our argument is that family separation
issues involve deep and difficult conflicts between competing values and inter-
ests, including the strong interests of individual family members. Depending on
the situation, the balance of these values will sometimes weigh in favor of fam-
ily separation, and sometimes against. As noted previously, we think that inter-
national law does to some extent, and should to a greater extent, place emphasis
on issues of justice within the family.
Third, we would like to examine more closely what we mean, and what
international law means, by the value of the family as an entity. The various
competing interests of individuals, as reflected in the first five categories of
treaty provisions discussed above, are relatively easy to understand and com-
pare. Though the content and weight given to individual rights may be con-
tested, it is at least possible to talk meaningfully about their universal
117. Charlesworth et aI., supra note 114, at 636; see also VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 67
(noting that the "potential of intemationallaw" to protect children effectively has been limited by its
embrace of the traditional public/private dichotomy).
lI8. VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 72.
119. As noted in the Introduction, we understand that a focus on family members' expressed
wishes is not sufficient in all cases to protect against oppression within the family; victims of abuse
or women facing strong cultural pressures may fear expressing a wish to leave their families, while
younger abused children may be literally unable to express themselves.
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application. 12o The provisions that protect the family unit are more difficult to
conceptualize. In what sense does the family as a unit or an institution have
value beyond the interests of its members? Treaty language describing the fam-
ily as a "natural" and "fundamental" unit brings to mind long-entrenched no-
tions that the traditional form of the family, with a man at its head, is fixed by
human biology and central to human society. But the case studies we discuss in
the next Section will demonstrate that far from being universal, what counts as a
"family" is radically culturally contingent, as is the social role that the institution
of family plays. When we discuss the value of family unity as something sepa-
rate from the interests of the individual members of families, we are not employ-
ing some abstract notion of "group autonomy," nor relying on the suspect notion
that human society has a "natural" unit or a "natural" order. Neither do we give
any weight to tradition- or natural law-based notions that family affairs are in
some way inherently private. Rather, we understand the value of the family unit
to be a social construction that can only be meaningfully understood when set in
a particular cultural context. Furthermore, we understand cultures themselves to
be fluid, not static-both evolving over time and subject to conflict within. 121
Notwithstanding these disclaimers, it would be overly simplistic to con-
clude that, because legal protections of the family have frequently perpetuated
oppression, international (or domestic) law should not seek to protect the family
at all. That the family's role as an institution is socially constructed does not
strip it of its significance; people live their lives in cultural context, not in ab-
stract universals. The family does unarguably play an important role in preserv-
ing cultures, and even though some cultural norms (for example, patriarchy) are
unjust and require transformation, we think cultural integrity is a valid concern
for international law. Indeed, we doubt many would disagree on this point; even
in the West, most feminists today at least temper the more rigorous universalist
principles advanced in decades past with respect for cultural difference. Fur-
thermore, as many of the treaty provisions above suggest, and as the case studies
below will demonstrate, the individual interests of women and children, as well
as a systemic concern with the eradication of gender-based and other forms of
inequality, often weigh strongly in favor of a norm against family separation.
As international law on this issue evolves, our challenge will be to identify the
circumstances in which, on balance, the competing values at stake compel the
application of such a norm. We attempt, with the following case studies, to shed
some light on that challenge.
120. This is not to say that concepts such as "rights" or even "interests" are inherently universal
or given. rather than constructed and contingent. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing
Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 303 (1988) (noting that the "best interests of the child is a highly
contingent social construction" that depends as much on "political and social judgments about what
kind of society we prefer" as on "neutral or scientific data about what is 'best' for children"). Bart-
lett's point is clearly supported by the example of the "child welfare" policies of the Australian
government discussed in Section IlA, as well as by the difficulties in applying the best interests test
discussed in Section 11.0.
121. See An-Na'im, supra note 75, at 67 (criticizing the search for single "authentic" represen-
tations of cultures).
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II.
CASE STUDIES
If international law does, in fact, contain a nonn against the involuntary
separation of families, what is the scope and content of that nonn? In this Sec-
tion, we use a number of case studies to flesh out the nature of and exceptions to
international protections of family integrity, and to consider how recognition of
those protections would influence several areas of national law and policy. In
Section A, we examine how states use family separation to attack the cultural
integrity of minority groups, focusing particularly on the history of Australia's
removal of Aboriginal children from their parents. In Section B, we analyze
France's recently implemented policy of forcibly separating polygamous immi-
grant families, and evaluate the need to balance the integrity of families with the
goal of gender equality. In Section C, we assess states' responsibilities to ac-
commodate family unification in their immigration policies, specifically focus-
ing on the removal policies of the United States. In Section D, we consider
international law's implications for domestic family law, in particular for the
protective removal of children by child welfare services in the United States.
Finally, in Section E, we consider instances of mass family separation as a co-
rollary of crisis situations.
A. Stolen Generations: Family Separation as Cultural Genocide
The forced separation of families is always painful to the individuals it
directly affects, but it is especially dangerous when targeted at discrete racial,
ethnic, or cultural minorities. In such situations, family separation may, by de-
sign or effect, attack the cultural integrity and possibly the survival of the entire
group, either by directly interfering with reproductive autonomy or by prevent-
ing younger members from learning the group's traditions and history. The sad
story of Australia's Stolen Generations,122 along with similar policies of re-
moval of indigenous children in other countries, is a notable example. During
the twentieth century, the Australian government systematically and forcibly re-
moved tens of thousands of Aboriginal children from their parents and gave
them to white adoptive parents. 123 In addition to these forced adoptions, the
government also removed many children from their families at a slightly older
age and forced them to attend white-run boarding schools. Although the remov-
als ended in the 1960s, their effects on Aboriginal life in Australia are still plain
today. Many, perhaps most, of these now-grown children still have no idea who
their birth parents or siblings were. Moreover, they have been completely dis-
122. This term was coined by Peter Read in 1982 and is now in common parlance. Jennifer
Clarke, Cubillo v. Commonwealth, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 218, 219 n.l (2001) (citing PETER READ,
THE STOLEN GENERATIONS: THE REMOVAL OF ABORIGINAL CHll.DREN IN NEW SOUTH WALES 1883
TO 1969 (1982». According to Prof. Robert Van Krieken, the term is "meant to refer to something
broader" than the physical removal of children; it "aims to capture the 'theft' of part-Aboriginal
children from their culture, their history, and their community." Robert Van Krieken, Is Assimila-
tion Justiciable? Lorna Cubillo & Peter Gunner v. Commonwealth, 23 SYDNEY L. REv. 239, 240
(2001).
123. See. e.g., READ, supra note 122.
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connected from the communities in which they were born, undermining their
sense of cultural identity.124 As this discussion will show, these policies violate
a number of international and Australian legal principles-yet none of these
principles has been enforced successfully either in Australian courts or by any
international institution that has considered the Stolen Generations travesty. The
development of a new international norm against involuntary family separation
might thus provide a viable remedy in a situation where other approaches have
failed.
1. History of the Stolen Generations
The removal policy in Australia had its roots in practices of the British
colonial era,125 but removals began on a large scale around 1910 and accelerated
with the passage of the Aboriginals Ordinance of 1918 in the Northern Territory
(where most Aboriginal Australians live). The Ordinance gave "exceptionally
wide powers,,126 to the Director of Native Welfare, who was authorized "at any
time to undertake the care, custody, or control of any aboriginal or half-caste, if,
in his opinion it [was] necessary or desirable in the interests of the aboriginal or
half-caste for him to do SO.,,127 Furthermore, he was authorized to order
Aboriginals or so-called "half-castes" to be removed for any reason or to be
detained in any "reserve or aboriginal institution," the latter a term that could
apply to schools, homes, missions, orphanages, or reformatories. 128 In 1947, the
ordinance was amended to make the Director the "legal guardian of every ab-
original and every half-caste child, notwithstanding that the child has a parent or
other relative living."129 The fact that the legal authorization for the removal
policy was ostensibly the "interests" of the children demonstrates the malleabil-
ity of "interests" language, especially when applied to children who are too
young to express their interests themselves.
Australia's child removal policy affected virtually all Aboriginal families.
A recent investigation by the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission found that nationally,
between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed
from their families and communities in the period from approximately 1910 until
1970 ... In that time not one Indigenous family has escaped the effects of
forcible removal '" Most families have been affected, in one or more genera-
tions, by the forcible removal of one or more children. 130
124. Philip Lynch, Keeping them Home: The Best Interests of Indigenous Children and Com-
munities in Canada and Australia, 23 SYDNEY L. REv. 501, 511-12 (2001).
125. See generally READ, supra note 122.
126. Cubillo v. Commonwealth, 174 A.L.R. 97, 154 (Austl. F.e. 2000).
127. Aboriginals Ordinance, 1918 (Aust.); see Clarke, supra nole 122, at 234. The position of
the Director of Native Welfare was originally referred to as Chief Protector of Aboriginals. Id. at
231. "Half-caste" referred to a multiracial person with any amount of Aboriginal ancestry. Id. at
232. In 1953, the Ordinance was amended to remove most "half-castes" from its scope. Id. at 237.
128. Clarke, supra note 122, at 234-35.
129. Id. at 232 (quoting the amendment).
130. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children From Their
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Notwithstanding these terrible statistics, the Australian case, while particu-
larly egregious, is not unique in kind. As one Australian commentator noted,
"First Nations and Aboriginal communities in North America and Australia have
been deprived of their children from the time of the European invasion.,,131
Both the United States and Canada implemented policies that forcibly placed
indigenous children in boarding schools as a means of cultural assimilation. In
Canada, this policy remained in effect until the 1970s, and even more recently,
some First Nations children have been removed and given to white adoptive
families. 132 In 1998, the Canadian government established a CAD$350 million
fund to award reparations to children who were sent to the boarding schools. 133
Even today, child welfare services in Canada, the United States, and Australia
remove indigenous children from their parents and place them in state or foster
care at dramatically higher rates than the rates at which non-indigenous children
are removed. 134
The negative effects of these removal policies on indigenous children's de-
velopment and psychological well-being are well documented and continue into
adulthood. 135 But the damage extends far beyond the individual children:
The removal of First Nations and Aboriginal children from their homes has a
devastating impact upon those who remain. The family unit, so often the primary
vehicle for the transmission of identity, meaning, love, and ultimately, meaningful
life, is destroyed. . . . With children gone, the shared goal of raising children
disintegrates. Parents give up: "If you lose your children you are dead." As the
family disintegrates, so too the community.... The net effect, felt both by those
who are removed and those who remain, is a sense of instability, loss, confusion,
and abandonment. "Because the family is the most fundamental economic, edu-
cation, health-care unit in society and the centre of an individual's emotional life,
assaults on Indian families help cause the conditions that characterise those cul-
tures of poverty where large numbers of people feel hopeless, powerless, and
unworthy.'d 36
The history of the Stolen Generations thus demonstrates how involuntary family
separation can operate as an assault on the individual, the family, and the com-
munity as a whole. 137
Families (1997) [hereinafter Commission Report], cited in George Williams, Race and the Austra-
lian Constitution: From Federation to Reconciliation. 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 643, 660 (2000).
131. Lynch, supra note 124, at 501-02 (citing a Canadian report documenting 200 years of
efforts by missionaries, teachers, and governments to assimilate indigenous children into white
society).
132. Id. at 502 (citing 1983 report by Manitoba County Services).
133. Ben Saul, The International Crime of Genocide in Australian Law, 22 SYDNEY L. REv.
527, 574 (2000).
134. Lynch, supra note 124, at 503-04 (citing factors of ten or more in removal rate
differences).
135. See id. at 504 (citing evidence that Stolen Generation children were, as adults, twice as
likely to be arrested or do drugs than were Aboriginal children who were not removed); id. at 511-12
(citing severe psychological and emotional damage); cf id. at 511 (quoting a native Canadian ac-
tivist saying the culture in boarding schools ingrained in Indians "a legacy of violence").
136. Id. at 518-19 (quoting comments of Russell Barsh and W. Byler on the destruction of
American Indian families).
137. See discussion infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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2. Applicability of the International Prohibition of Genocide
The Australian child removal policy has often been described as cultural
genocide. 138 Indeed, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission re-
port stated unambiguously, without the "cultural" modifier: "[The removals]
were an act of genocide, aimed at wiping out Indigenous families, communities
and cultures, vital to the precious and inalienable heritage of Australia." 139 The
removal policy clearly demonstrates certain core elements of the crime of geno-
cide. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as '
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.140
Australia's child removal policy evidently fits into category (e); the question,
however, is whether it meets the requirements of the intent element emphasized
above. The policy was expressly intended to bring about the total assimilation
of Aboriginal children into white society. Although never officially admitted by
the Australian government, which has described the removals as a child welfare
policy, the end goal may well have been to eliminate Aboriginal society as a
distinct cultural group-at least "in part," which is all the Convention re-
quires. 141 The fact that not every Aboriginal child was removed does not dis-
prove the intent element, as the strategy may have been to erode Aboriginal
culture gradually over the course of generations.
Yet despite arguably possessing the characteristics of the crime of geno-
cide, the history of the Stolen Generations and its treatment by Australian courts
demonstrate the inadequacy of the international prohibition of genocide as a
mechanism for addressing family separation, even when it is targeted at distinct
minorities. Although Australia has ratified the Genocide Convention, it has
never passed implementing legislation. Courts have held that the crime of geno-
cide is not incorporated into Australia's common law,142 and they have rejected
the argument that the Stolen Generations policy was a violation of an implicit
138. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 124, at 520.
139. Commission Report, supra note 130.
140. Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 2 (emphasis added). Note that while clause (e)
is relevant in the Australian case, clause (d) of this definition may also be applicable to some fonns
of family separation. The systematic separation of men from women, which necessarily separates
families, may be a measure intended to interfere with the group's ability to reproduce.
141. As one member of the National Commission established to investigate the removal prac-
tice stated, "'the attempt to "solve the Aboriginal problem" by the taking away of children and
merging them into white society fell within [the modern definition of genocide].''' Timothy L.H.
McConnack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 681, 725 n. 230 (1997) (quoting statement by l.H. Wootten).
142. See Saul, supra note 133, at 533 (describing the holding in Nulyarimma v. Thompson, 165
A.L.R. 621 (1999».
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constitutional right to freedom from genocide. 143 Some commentators have ar-
gued that Australia's failure to enforce its international law obligations stems
from its refusal to admit that "genocide," a term very much associated with Nazi
Germany, could ever take place in a "civilized" country like Australia. 144 In-
deed, Australian officials proudly tout the country's human rights record. 145
Critics have argued that the refusal to expressly crirninalize genocide re-
flects an unwillingness to confront the implications of the child removal pol-
icy~demonstrating an unspoken recognition that the policy at least raises the
issue of genocide. Australian officials claim that existing laws, such as those
against murder, proscribe sufficiently the underlying acts that constitute geno-
cide. 146 Yet no official has ever been convicted of a crime for implementing the
child removal policy.147 Moreover, Aboriginal plaintiffs challenging the policy
through civil claims have thus far been unsuccessful, although few cases have
yet been heard and thousands more are pending. 148 Taken together, this case
law demonstrates the inadequacy of reliance on either existing domestic laws or
the international prohibition on genocide.
In the future, Australian courts may recognize a crime of genocide pursuant
to recent legislation passed to implement Australia's obligations under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.149 The Rome Statute lacks retroac-
tive effect, however. Moreover, precedent shows that Australian courts would
not consider the child removal policy to amount to genocide even if a legal
prohibition existed. The first case brought to Australian courts by members of
the Stolen Generations was Kruger v. Commonwealth in 1997. In a declaratory
judgment action, plaintiffs alleged that the removal policy exceeded the govern-
ment's constitutional powers, violated the freedom of religion, and breached im-
plied constitutional provisions protecting equality and freedom of movement
and preventing genocide. 150 In Kruger, the Australian High Court reserved con-
sideration of the question (later resolved in the negative by the Full Federal
Court) of whether the crime of genocide was prohibited by Australian law. lSI
Instead, the Court held that the child removal policy did not amount to genocide.
In the Court's view, the necessary element of intent to harm or destroy the Ab-
143. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 190 c.L.R. I (1997).
144. See Saul, supra note 133, at 540-41 (citing statements by Australian politicians); see also
McCormack, supra note 141, at 725 (noting that "[i)n Australia, the prevailing view is that, as the
[child removal policy] did not involve extermination camps and gas-ovens, [it) could not have con-
stituted genocide").
145. Williams, supra note 130, at 644-45 (citing, inter alia, statement of Prime Minister John
Howard).
146. Saul, supra note 133, at 541 (citing Australian submissions to U.N. Human Rights
Committee).
147. See generally id. Forcible transfer of children is not a crime under the Australian Criminal
Code. [d. at 543.
148. [d. at 570-71; see Cubillo, 174 A.L.R. at 97.
149. Saul, supra note 133, at 541.
ISO. Clarke, supra note 122, at 219 n.3.
151. 190 CLR. I (1997); see Saul, supra note 133, at 533-34.
HeinOnline -- 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 239 2003
2003] FAMILY SEPARATION 239
original population was absent; rather, the policy's intent was to promote child
welfare. 152
In Cubillo v. Commonwealth, the first civil damages suit concerning the
Stolen Generations, an Australian federal court similarly referred to the remov-
als as an Aboriginal "protection" and "welfare" policy that, though "badly mis-
guided," was "well-meaning."153 Cubillo, which was later affirmed on
appeal,154 was a tort suit for wrongful imprisonment, negligence, and breach of
statutory and fiduciary duty. Without foreclosing the possibility that these legal
theories might succeed in future challenges to the child removals, the Cubillo
court held that the evidentiary record in this case lacked sufficient information
about whether the plaintiff was in the care of a parent before she was taken. The
court also held that it was inappropriate to rule on the overall validity of the
child removal policy in a tort suit by an individual plaintiff, and accordingly
excluded parliamentary apologies and other evidence of the policy's wrongful-
ness. 155 This analysis demonstrates the weakness of domestic litigation by indi-
viduals (at least pursuant to ordinary domestic law) as a strategy for addressing
policies of widespread and systematic family separation. In contrast to this
piecemeal domestic law approach, an international law approach would allow
judgment on the lawfulness of a state policy taken as a whole.
But the Stolen Generations case likewise demonstrates the pitfalls of reli-
ance on the international prohibition against genocide as a strategy against fam-
ily separation policies that target particular ethnic groups. Part of the problem
lies in the language of the Genocide Convention itself. When the Convention
was drafted, it included an express prohibition on cultural genocide. 156 How-
ever, this language was removed from the final version. 157 Many delegates felt
that the equation of destruction of cultures with the actual mass murder of peo-
ples would trivialize the crime and inhibit the effective formation of interna-
tional norms against atrocities like those in Nazi Germany.15S Furthermore, at
that time a number of countries, including the United States, had explicit poli-
cies of assimilating immigrant and indigenous groups, and thus opposed using
the Convention to protect cultural difference. 159 Despite this resistance, the
Convention goes beyond mass murder by reaching removals of children and
policies designed to interfere with reproduction. 160 Scholars have suggested
152. See Saul, supra note 133, at 533-34.
153. Cubillo, 174 A.L.R. 97 (2000); see Clarke, supra note 122, at 222; Van Krieken, supra
note 122, at 258-59. Similarly, Canadian courts have relied on the principle of the "best interests" of
the child to support Canada's child removal policies. See Alston, supra note 73, at 20-21.
154. Cubillo v. Commonwealth, 183 A.L.R. 249 (2001).
155. Clarke, supra note 122, at 250.
156. Saul, supra note 133, at 555.
157. Id.
158. See Matthew Lippman, An and Ideology in the Third Reich: The Protection of Cultural
Propeny and the Humanitarian Law of War, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1,62 (1998).
159. Saul, supra note 133, at 555.
160. Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 2(c)-(e).
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that the inclusion of these provisions enabled the Convention to reach certain
forms of cultural genocide without expressly using that phrase. 161
Yet the Convention's intent requirement may frustrate this indirect ap-
proach to cultural genocide. For a policy to constitute genocide, it must be in-
tended to destroy a group, in whole or in part-language that arguably may not
encompass the simple destruction of the group's cultural integrity. Moreover,
the intent requirement has proven to be a significant obstacle to indigenous
groups in pursuing claims of genocide in general. 162 The requirement of "spe-
cial intent" is more stringent than the intent elements of ordinary crimes, requir-
ing evidence of a clear purpose on the part of the perpetrator, rather than mere
knowledge of the likely consequences. 163
Furthermore, as a practical matter, although the Convention has been im-
portant in solidifying an international consensus against genocide, it has virtu-
ally never been enforced on an international level. In fact, although it entered
into force in 1951, and although there have been several widely recognized
cases of genocide since then, 164 the world's first conviction for the international
crime of genocide did not take place until 1999, in a decision by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.165
3. Other Applicable Provisions of International Law
In addition to the international prohibition of genocide, Australia's child
removal policy contravened a number of other principles of international law,
some long since established and some emerging today. For example, when
targeted against indigenous or other racial or ethnic groups, family separation
policies violate international customary and conventional law against race dis-
crimination.166 But absent some particular elaboration of why and under what
circumstances family separation policies violate them, general provisions of in-
ternational law against racism, like the prohibition of genocide, may not set a
clear enough norm to deter countries from adopting policies like Australia's.
161. See Rhona K. M. Smith, The International Impact of Creative Problem-Solving: Resolving
the Plight of Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 411,414 (1998).
162. McCormack, supra note 141, at 723; Saul, supra note 133, at 566.
163. Saul, supra note 133, at 566.
164. The post-World War II atrocities most broadly agreed to constitute genocide are those in
Cambodia and Rwanda. See, e.g., Ivan Eland, Middle East: What Should the United States Do
About Saddam Hussein?, 50 EMORY L.J. 833, 836 (2001). Events in Bosnia are also often referred
to as genocide. See, e.g., Kofi Annan, Opening Remarks: Advocating for an International Criminal
Court, 21 FORDHAM INr'L L.J. 363, 364-65 (1997); Ronald C. Slye, International Law, Human
Rights Beneficiaries, and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility of International Human Rights
Law, 2 CHI. J. INr'L L. 59, 59 (2001). Some commentators have used the term "genocide" to de-
scribe events in Biafra, Bangladesh, Somalia, and East Timor as well. See, e.g., Evo Popoff, Note,
Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law: Can the International Criminal
Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. lNT'L
L. REv. 363, 368 (2001); Mary Margaret Penrose, Impunity-Inertia, Inaction, and Invalidity: A
Literature Review, 17 B.U. INr'L L. J. 269, 282 (1999).
165. Saul, supra note 133, at 527.
166. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2(1); CERD, supra note 22, art. 2.
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Australia has never admitted that its child removal policy was racist; it charac-
terizes the policy as a well-intentioned mistake.
Were it enacted today, Australia's policy would violate the requirements of
Article 20(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires that
when the state separates a child from its parents, even in the child's best inter-
ests, it be sensitive to the cultural heritage of the child in selecting alternative
care arrangements. 167 Furthermore, policies such as Australia's are inconsistent
with the principles embodied in certain international declarations promoting pro-
tection of the specific rights of indigenous peoples. For example, the U.N. Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples explicitly addresses the issue in
Article 6, which states in relevant part:
Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security
as distinct peoples and to full guarantees against genocide or any other act of
violence, including the removal of indigenous children from their families and
. . d 168communIties un er any pretext.
In addition, other provisions of the Draft Declaration are certainly impli-
cated by Australia's policy, including Article 7, which prevents cultural geno-
cide, including population transfer or forced assimilation, and Article 15,
protecting the right of indigenous children to "education in their own culture and
language." But although the language of the Draft Declaration is encouragingly
strong, it is not a treaty and does not bind any country. In general, international
protection of indigenous rights is inchoate. Other than the African Charter,
which alone among the major human rights conventions protects the rights of
peoples, no treaty currently in force in any significant number of nations ex-
pressly protects these rightS. 169 Thus, an approach to the child removal issue
premised on international legal protections of indigenous peoples would cur-
rently be ineffective.
167. See generally VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 102 (discussing this requirement).
168. Res. 1994/45, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties, 46th Sess. U.N. Doc. E1CN.4/Sub.2/199412/Add.1 (1994). See also Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, World Conf. on Human Rights, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993)
(providing vague protection for the "human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people,"
as well as their "distinct identities, culture, and social organization"); Proposed American Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1333rd
Sess., 95th Reg. Sess., art. 5 (1997) (prohibiting "enforced assimilation" and the "destruction of a
culture," and protecting the right to develop a cultural identity), available at http://www.cidh.oas.
orglindigenous.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002); id. art. 7 (protecting the right to cultural integrity);
id. art. 11 (protecting indigenous families and requiring that courts separating families consider "the
views of the peoples, including individual, family, and community views"). Like the UN Draft
Declaration, neither the Vienna Declaration nor the Proposed American Declaration are binding
treaties.
169. See, e.g., Carlos M. Ayala Corao, Situation of the Human Rights of Indigenous Persons
and Peoples in the Americas, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.UVffi.108 Doc. 62 (2000) (critiquing inadequacy
of current treaty law), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/indigenas/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2002).
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Therefore, despite the apparent inconsistency of Australia's child removal
policy with international norms against race discrimination, discrimination
against indigenous persons, and possibly genocide, no effective international or
domestic law remedy has been provided to the victims thus far. The main prob-
lem lies in convincing people generally, and courts specifically, that the policy
was motivated by malice or animus against the group. The history of the Stolen
Generations thus provides a case study supporting the necessity of international
legal norms specifically prohibiting involuntary separation of families, without a
requirement of group-based animus. Of course, where courts consider the valid-
ity of specific removals of children-for example, those intended to protect the
welfare of victims of abuse or neglect-they should take into account the exis-
tence of group-based animus or stereotypes. Reviewing courts should vigilantly
guard against child removals that are premised on discriminatory assumptions
about different groups' caretaking abilities. We will discuss these issues further
in Section 11.0.
There are several different ways to classify the wrong inherent in the Aus-
tralian child removal policy: as a crime against the individual child, as a crime
against the family, or as a crime against a cultural and racial group. These inter-
pretations are not mutually exclusive; we believe that all are accurate. An inter-
national norm against family separation would primarily address the first two
categories of harm, protecting the rights of individuals to remain with their fami-
lies as well as the rights of families themselves. Certainly, in the case of the
Stolen Generations, conceiving of the harm done in these ways alone would
miss an important facet of the story; a crucial part of the tragedy and the evil of
the child removals was its lasting impact on Aboriginal communities and cul-
ture. 170 Yet the private suffering experienced by the children and the families
they left behind should not be downplayed. A norm against involuntary family
separation might help to prevent or remedy such harms without the necessity of
proving discriminatory intent. Furthermore, a robust, fully developed norm
against family separation ought to take broader group injuries into account. Ac-
cordingly, family separation policies that target discrete minorities should be
understood as a particularly egregious violation of international law, perhaps
rising to the level of a crime against humanity. The inclusion of a prohibition on
child transferal in the Genocide Convention demonstrates that the international
community has already come to understand some discriminatory family separa-
tion policies as falling within the ambit of international criminal law.
In terms of identifying the exact contours of an international legal norm
against family separation, the Stolen Generations example is perhaps not very
useful, precisely because the violation of international law is so clear. A number
170. Cf Lynch, supra note 124, at 520-21 (critiquing family courts' overly individualistic focus
on the best interests of indigenous children, arguing that for indigenous persons, individual, family,
and community needs cannot meaningfully be separated).
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of different and important values recognized by international law are at play: the
integrity of families, the elimination of racial discrimination, the protection of
indigenous cultures, and the welfare of children. What makes this case easy is
that all of those values point in the same direction: toward the illegality of Aus-
tralia's conduct. Although Australia ostensibly justified the removals based on
child welfare, the actual harms suffered by the children it affected are well docu-
mented. 171 Furthermore, to the extent that child welfare concerns were pre-
mised on the idea that Aboriginals were unfit or otherwise inferior parents-or
that children were inherently better off if raised in white Australian culture-
they reflect racial stereotypes that cannot count as legitimate interests for the
purposes of international law. 172 In short, there is no compelling justification
for the involuntary separation of Aboriginal families, and a number of strong
international law arguments against it. Thus, Australia's child removal policy is
a core example of state behavior prohibited by the international legal norm
against family separation.
B. What Constitutes a Family? The Case of Polygamous Immigrants
in France
If international law recognizes, or should recognize, norms against family
separation, how do we define the "family" that these norms protect? Under-
standings of what groups of people constitute legitimate families vary tremen-
dously cross-culturally and are often highly contested within cultures. The
institution of polygamous marriage represents one particularly deep intercultural
divide. In this section, we consider the case of polygamous immigrant families
in France, who have recently been subjected to a sudden change in legal regime
that has forced many of them to choose between permanently separating and
being deported. We argue that the draconian retroactive aspects of France's
policy should be understood to violate international law; however, we believe
that some anti-polygamy measures are not only allowed but encouraged or even
required by international law. The separation of polygamous families poses a
difficult case for international law because it requires the balancing of strong,
conflicting internationally recognized values and interests-in particular, weigh-
ing families' rights not to be forcibly separated against women's rights to gender
equality and freedom from coercive family environments.
17 J. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
172. See Robert Manne, The Child's Interests Must Come First,- SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Aug. 14, 2000, at 14 (arguing that the Cubillo decision was "blind to the racist assumptions that
conditioned what, for 40 years, the administrators regarded as being, self-evidently, in the best inter-
ests of the child"); cf Lynch, supra note 124, at 520-24 (critiquing "best interests of the child"
standard as employed by contemporary family courts in Australia and Canada for being insensitive
to cultural difference). But see Van Krieken, supra note 122, at 258 (criticizing Manne's argument
and arguing that the Cubillo court recognized the prejudices of administrators, but could not deem
their actions unauthorized by law because the prejudices were in fact embodied in the law of the
time).
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1. The Status of Polygamy in the Contemporary World
Polygamy, the marriage of one man to more than one woman,173 has for
centuries been nearly unknown in the West. 174 It is forbidden by mainstream
Christian and Jewish religious doctrine,175 and no Western country today legally
sanctions the performance of polygamous marriages. 176 When practiced by par-
ticular groups within Western countries-most notably by the Mormons in the
United States during the nineteenth century, and to a much smaller extent to-
day-mainstream society has condemned polygamy as immoral, sexist, and de-
structive to children, and has pressured these groups to change their practices. 177
In most Western countries, to the extent that polygamy survives today, it is seen
at best as a distasteful oddity.178
Yet in much of the world, polygamy is very much alive. Islamic law autho-
rizes each man to have as many as four wives, and the law in many Muslim
countries incorporates this ru1e. 179 Polygamy is also a long-standing tradition in
many African cultures and remains prevalent today, especially in West Af-
rica. 180 A 1998 study found that over fifty percent of women in Senegal,
Burkina Faso, Togo, and Benin were in polygamous marriages, with just slightly
smaller percentages in a number of other countries. 181 Polygamy is legal in a
significant majority of non-industrialized countries. 182 Even nations that have
constitutional provisions against sex discrimination often specifically exempt
marriage 1aws.183
However, polygamy is culturally contested even within societies where it is
legal and common. Over the past two decades, women's rights advocates within
many Third World countries have begun to scrutinize polygamy's effect on gen-
der hierarchy, within the family and in society at large. Today, many African
women's groups and activists are working actively to end this tradition. 184 Nat-
173. Polyandry, the marriage of one woman to more than one man, is extremely rare almost
everywhere. See Reuel S. Amdur, Here Come the Brides, OrrAwA CITIZEN, Jul. 20, 2002, at B7.
174. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53, 61
(1997).
175. See WUUPEDIA, available at http://www.wikipedia.orglwikilpolygamy (last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
176. See Lydia Esteve Gonzalez & Richard Mac Bride, Fortress Europe: Fear of Immigration?
Present and Future of Immigration Law and Policy in Spain, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'y 153,
178 (2000) (stating that polygamy is banned in every European Union country).
177. See Chambers, supra note 174, at 63-67; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878) (affinning conviction of a Monnon for bigamy and noting that polygamy "has always
been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe").
178. See Chambers, supra note 174, at 73.
179. Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black
America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-first Century, II J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 812 (2001).
180. Benedicte Manier, Polygamy in Africa resisting pressure of change: Repon, AGENCE
FRANCE PREsSE, Apr. 16, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2262382.
181. /d.
182. Chambers, supra note 174, at 61.
183. Wing, supra note 179, at 844.
184. Lara Santoro, First Wives Club Unites in Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1998,
at I; Howard W. French, For Women in Ivory Coast, New Fight for Equality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1996, at A41.
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urally, polygamy is not the only feature of life in many of these societies that
relegates women to a position of inferiority; where women are culturally deval-
ued, monogamous marriage can also be a subordinating institution. 185
2. Polygamy Among Immigrant Families in France
The situation of polygamous families living in France highlights both inter-
and intra-cultural conflicts over what forms of "family" society and the law
should recognize. While France, Europe's most multiethnic society, is home to
millions of recently arrived immigrants from former French colonies in Africa, it
is also a particularly jealous guardian of its own traditional culture, to which
immigrants have faced increasing pressure to assimilate. 186 The arrival of po-
lygamous immigrant families has thus created a serious cultural clash. Polyga-
mous marriages may not lawfully be performed in France, but for several
decades, driven by its postwar need for immigrant labor,187 France legally rec-
ognized foreign polygamous marriages so long as they were valid in the country
in which they were performed. This policy enabled male immigrants to bring
multiple wives into the country on long-term spousal visas. 188 A substantial
number of immigrants, mostly from West Africa, took advantage of this policy.
As a result, France had 200,000 people living in polygamous families by the
1990s.189 These families were primarily concentrated in enclaves in the poorer
Paris suburbs, where today they make up the majority of some communities. 190
In the 1980s and early 1990s, African women's advocacy groups in France
began to criticize the living situations of the wives of polygamous men. The
issues paralleled those raised by some women living in Africa: 191 many first
185. Cf. Chambers, supra note 174, at 65-66 (noting that late nineteenth-century American
women were not, on average, more liberated than women in polygamous Mormon families).
186. See Jeremy Jennings, Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary
France, 30 BRIT. J. POLIT. SCI. 575, 575 (2000) (stating that "despite an astonishing level of cultural
and ethnic diversity, France has seen itself as and has sought to become a monocultural society"); id.
at 576-79 (arguing that "French universalism" is inconsistent with particularistic claims for minority
rights). See also Bertrand Bissuel, Divorcer ou Vivre Sans Papiers: Le Dilemme des Femmes de
Polygames, LE MONDE, Feb. 10, 2002, available at http://www.lemondeJr/article/0,5987,3226--
262133-,00.html (noting that the desire to force immigrants to assimilate to mainstream culture was
a major factor behind the adoption of anti-polygamy laws).
187. Jon Henley, "I Can't Say to a Wife of 20 Years She Has to Go": Polygamy Used to Be
Tolerated in France-But Not Any More, GUARDIAN, May 9, 2001, at 16 (also citing a 1980 govern-
ment directive stating that polygamy among immigrants was not "contrary to the public order").
188. See Adrian Pennink, Thousands of Families in Despair as France Enforces Ban on Polyg-
amy, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 1,2001, at 22.
189. Marlise Simons, African Women in France Battling Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996,
at Al (200,000 people in the Paris area alone); Wilma Randle, So Far From Home, ESSENCE, Sept.
1998, at 76 (200,000 in France); see also Pennink, supra note 188 (140,000 in France, as of 2001).
It is unclear whether Pennink's lower estimate reflects the effects of the anti-polygamy policy or is
simply based on different data; in any event, accurate estimates of numbers are impossible "because
foreign wives are often in the country clandestinely and immigrants keep other wives back in Af-
rica." Simons, supra; see also Judy Scales-Trent, African Women in France: Immigration, Family,
and Work, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 70S, 720 (1999).
190. Simons, supra note 189.
191. See id. (citing Madine Diallo's statement that "it is a myth that African women like polyg-
amy," whether in Africa or in France).
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wives were shocked and hurt by their husbands' decisions to take additional
spouses,192 rivalry among the women was common,193 and some women were
coerced into marriage at a young age by their families. In addition, living in
France brought new challenges for these families. In Africa, each wife generally
had her own house or hut for herself and her children; not so in France, where
housing was very expensive. 194 As a result, large families, sometimes over
twenty people, were crammed into tiny apartments where privacy was nonexis-
tent. 195 Tensions often grew among the spouses and children, sometimes to the
point of violence,196 and some wives wanted out of their marriages or even
attempted suicide. 197 In addition, mainstream French society's repugnance for
polygamy made newly arrived women and their children feel unwelcome in
their new communities. Children often feared mockery by their classmates, and
delinquency rates were high. 198 Second and third wives with proper residence
and working papers sometimes had trouble accessing the government's health
care and social security benefits.199 As a result of these pressures, some African
women's groups began to lobby the government to discourage polygamy
through changes in its immigration policies.2OO
Concurrent with these developments was a rise in French anti-immigrant
sentiment. Statements and policies of mainstream political leaders reflected this
trend. Jacques Chirac, now the French president, gave a speech while mayor of
Paris in which, talking about African immigrants, he declared: "If you add the
noise they make and the smell, well, the French worker goes mad. And if it
were you, you would go mad toO.,,201 In this political context, polygamy was a
lighming rod for anti-immigrant attitudes. Politicians characterized polygamous
families as burdens on the welfare state: Chirac derided families "with a father,
three or four wives, twenty kids, who receive 50,000 francs in welfare payments,
without working, naturally.',202 Furthermore, polygamy was seen as an obstacle
to immigrants' assimilation into mainstream French culture, and anti-immigrant
groups thus portrayed it as a threat to the stability of French society itself.203
192. Randle, supra note 189.
193. Simons, supra note 189.
194. Henley, supra note 187; Randle, supra note 189.
195. Ruth Nabakwe, African Polygamous Life in a Western Context, AFRICA NEWS, Dec. 4,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File.
196. Simons, supra note 189.
197. Bissuel, supra note 186 (citing Isabelle Gillette-Faye of the Group for the Abolition of
Sexual Mutilation, who also stated that physical violence between co-wives caused some women
severe physical injury).
198. Nabakwe, supra note 195.
199. Angeline Oyog, France: African Women Seek to Break Out of Chains ofPolygamy, lNrER
PREss SERVICE, Mar. 4, 1992, available at LEXIS, News Library, Inter Press Service File.
200. [d.; Bissuel, supra note 186.
201. Pennink, supra note 188.
202. Bissuel, supra note 186 (translated from French).
203. Henley, supra note 187 (noting that polygamy was perceived as "one of many foreign
customs that were a threat to French society"); Emmanuelle Andrez & Alexis Spire, Droits des
errangers et statut personnel, PLEIN DROIT No. 51, Nov. 2001 (stating that in the early 1990s, polyg-
amy was stigmatized as a sign of failed integration, and experts were solicited to support the view
that eradicating it was essential to the goal of assimilation), available at hllp:/Iwww.gisti. org/docl
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In 1993, the government responded to these various pressures by passing
new immigration legislation known as Ie Ioi Pasqua, after then-Interior Minister
Charles Pasqua. Among other changes, the new law substantially changed
French policy regarding polygamy. First, it changed the immigration policy so
that only one spouse of each new French immigrant would be issued a spousal
visa and working papers and be eligible for the allocationfamiliale (the family
allowance, a welfare benefit); the other spouses and their children were ex-
cluded.204 Second, these changes were applied retroactively to families that had
already immigrated.2os Under the new policy, polygamous men and all their
wives would lose their working and residence papers and allocation familiaIe,
and be subject to deportation, unless they legally divorced and physically sepa-
rated the household so that each wife was living separately. This policy was
mitigated somewhat by a longstanding law that immigrants whose children are
French citizens cannot be deported, but even these parents could lose their work-
ing papers and welfare eligibility.2°6 In addition, a circular issued in 2000 for-
malized the practice of not applying the retroactive provisions of the laws to the
first wife of a polygamous husband, but only to his subsequent wives.2°7
For the first five or six years after the law's passage, it was not enforced
against families already in France.2°8 In the past several years, however, en-
forcement has begun in earnest, and the effects of the new policy are now be-
coming evident.209 For a few women, the policy has provided the excuse they
needed to leave their living arrangements;210 for most, it appears to be a disas-
ter. Facing harsh penalties, these families face several unattractive options: ac-
plein-droitl5I1statut.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); see also Jennings, supra note 186, at 589 (cit-
ing Christian Jelen's polemic against multiculturalism, which associated polygamy with practices
such as cannibalism and cutting off the hands of thieves).
204. The loi Pasqua was passed as an amendment to the immigration ordinance of November 2,
1945. Article 30 reads: "Lorsqu'un etranger polygame reside sur Ie territoire fran<.ais avec un pre-
mier conjoint, Ie benefice du regroupement familial ne peut etre accorde iI un autre conjoint. Sauf si
cet autre conjoint est decede ou ctechu de ses droits parentaux, ses enfants ne beneficient pas non
plus du regroupement familial." See ttapes d'une repression, PLEIN DRorr, No. 51, Nov. 2001,
available at http://www.gisti.orgldoc/plein-droitl5I1etapes.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
205. Article 15bis states, "La carte de resident ne peut etre delivree iI un ressortissant etranger
qui vit en etat de polygamie ni aux conjoints d'un tel ressortissant. Une carte de resident delivree en
meconnaissance de ces dispositions doit etre retiree." Id.
206. See Polygamie: mieux vaut tard ... , PLEIN DRorr No. 46, Sept. 2000 (quoting Polygamie:
ne pas se tromper de combat!, PLEIN DRorr No. 36, Dec. 1997) (arguing that French children are not
spared from the policy's effects when their parents are prevented from working and cut off from
welfare benefits) available at http://www.gistLorgldoc/plein-droitl46/polygamie.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2002); see also Bissuel, supra note 186; Jean-Pierre Alaux, A la rue sous pretexte de
polygamie, PLEIN DRorr No. 51, Nov. 2001, available at http://www.gisti.orgldoc/plein-droitl511
polygamie.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
207. ttapes d'une repression, supra note 204. Occasionally first wives have had their papers
revoked anyway. See Charlotte Rotman, Un An Pour Paraftre Monogame, LIBERATION, July 7,
2000.
208. Henley, supra note 187.
209. Id.
210. See also Nabakwe, supra note 195 (stating that some members of polygamous families,
including men, have supported the policy).
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cept deportation, try to live in France as sans-papiers (illegal immigrants or
those lacking work permits), or divorce and split up the family.211 The last
option is obviously unappealing for those who are satisfied with their existing
living situations, but even for those who are not, divorce poses major problems.
Many women are opposed to divorce on principle,212 and furthermore, reloca-
tion can cause major upheaval in the lives of the women and their children.
Beyond that, relocation is often a practical impossibility, as families simply can-
not afford to pay for multiple homes.213 In cases where the husband elects to
divorce all but his first wife to maintain his own immigration status, the other
wives (and frequently their children) often find themselves thrown out on the
street with nowhere to gO?14 Today, many such women are living as squatters
in abandoned buildings around PariS?15 Others have been sent back to Af-
rica?16 According to Jean-Pierre Alaux of the immigrants' rights group GISTI,
"eight years after the institutionalization of [anti-polygamy laws] ... it is wo-
men who are paying the price."217
Furthermore, the French authorities have often been quite strict in their
application of the law. A physical separation of households is required, not just
legal divorce. Immigration authorities have refused to certify families as com-
plying with the new conditions when they have simply rented additional apart-
ments in the same building?18 Enforcement is often carried out by the police,
who have reportedly harassed and interrogated immigrant women about their
private lives, demanding evidence that they have completed their "de-
cohabitation.,,219
Today, some of the same African women's advocates who pushed for a
crackdown on polygamy decry the [oi Pasqua as being unduly draconian and as
inflicting serious harm on the very group of people it was intended to help.
Some commentators have noted that the law, though ostensibly designed as a
response to feminist concerns, was in fact meant to appeal to French xenophobia
and the backlash against the welfare state.220 In other words, conservative poli-
ticians co-opted the gender equality issue and twisted it to serve their own
agenda. According to activist Lydie Dooh Bunya, "[t]he French authorities have
211. Bissuel, supra note 186.
212. African Women Caught Between Difficult Choices in France, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
DAILY NEWSWlRE, Feb. 13, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, PANA File.
213. Rotman, supra note 207.
214. Alaux, supra note 206.
215. Bissuel, supra note 186. Housing discrimination may make relocation even more difficult.
See Pennink, supra note 188 (describing the plight of one woman who, with her eight children, was
forced to squat after being "turned back from dozens of better apartments because the residents just
do not want her to live there").
216. Rotman, supra note 207.
217. Alaux, supra note 206 (translated from French). GIST! stands for Groupe d'information
et de soutien des immigres [Group for the Information and Support of Immigrants].
218. See Pennink, supra note 201.
219. Bissuel, supra note 186.
220. [d.
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just found a pretext to render life much more difficult for all Africans in France
and to force us to leave.,,221
Under pressure from immigrants' rights groups, the government has re-
cently passed several measures intended to soften the blow of the [oi Pasqua.
However, these measures will not eliminate the damage. For example, in 1998
the government re-enacted the basic provisions of the [oi Pasqua in the [oi
Chevenement, but created exceptions under which certain limited categories of
people could receive one-year visas.222 In April 2000, the Ministry of the Inte-
rior issued a circular allowing these temporary visas to be issued more broadly
to polygamous spouses,223 but these measures were only intended to buy time
for the families to make new housing arrangements. The circular made visa
renewal dependant on ending cohabitation?24 Furthermore, the government
delayed circulation of the order to local officials, a delay that immigrants' rights
advocate Claudette Bodin alleges was due to election-year anti-immigrant polit-
ics.225 In 2000, a government circular authorized the re-issuance of work per-
mits for non-deportable parents of French children.226 Following the lead of
non-governmental organizations, the government issued another circular in 2001
ordering local officials to help displaced wives gain access to emergency shel-
ter.227 Advocates have criticized this policy as a grossly inadequate solution to
a problem of the government's own making.228
Prior to the passage of the [oi Pasqua, the French courts had traditionally
recognized the right of polygamous immigrant families to enter France and re-
side together?29 However, in 1997, the Conseil d'Etat upheld the authority of
the administration to refuse to renew resident visas on the basis of the new
laws.23o In addition, the Ministry of the Interior's April 2000 circular support-
ing the enforcement of the laws cited the "consistent" holdings of the Conseil
d'Etat that polygamous families were not covered by Article 8 of the European
221. Angeline Oyog, France: Clamping Down on Polygamy to Chase Out Foreigners, INTER
PREss SERVICE, Jun. 17, 1993, available at 1993 WL 2540140. Dooh Bunya also explained that the
French did not take the problem of polygamy seriously until they came to see it as a burden on the
welfare system. [d.
222. See Etapes d'une Repression, supra note 204.
223. Ministere de I'Interieur, Circulaire du 25 avril 2000, available at http://www.gisti.orgl
doc/textesI2000/circulaire-polygames.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); see also Bissuel, supra note
186.
224. Ministere de l'Interieur, supra note 223; see also Bissuel, supra note 186; Alaux, supra
206.
225. Henley, supra note 187. The circular was eventually made public in June 2000. Rotman,
supra note 207.
226. See Polygamie: mieux vaut tard ... ,PLEIN DROIT No. 46, Sept. 2000 (discussing both
policy changes) available at http://www.gisti.orgldoc/plein-droit/46/polygamie.html(last visited
Oct. 22, 2002).
227. Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations have also started to make efforts to help dis-
placed wives of polygamists find housing; however, such initiatives are too few and far-between to
make a substantial dent in the problem. See Bissuel, supra note 186.
228. See Alaux, supra note 206.
229. See Andrez & Spire, supra note 203 (citing the Montcho decision of the Conseil d'Etat in
1980).
230. See Etapes d'une repression, supra note 204 (discussing this decision).
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Convention on Human Rights, which protects the privacy of family life.231 The
circular also cited a 1993 advisory opinion of the Conseil Constitutionnel, which
had confirmed that the law only protected "the conditions of a normal family
life," with "normal" conditions defined as those that are dominant in France-
that is, not polygamy?32 The Ministry circular concluded: "In fact, the prohibi-
tion of polygamy is founded on a necessary respect for republican values, for
women's rights, and for the integration of children [into French society].,,233
4. Value Conflicts and Balancing of Interests in the Regulation of
Polygamy
As these decisions suggest, the legal status of polygamy and the immigra-
tion of polygamous families both pose difficult problems for the articulation of
international legal norms against involuntary family separation. As a general
rule, polygamy is a serious obstacle to gender equality, both in the societies that
practice it traditionally and when transplanted into new contexts through immi-
gration?34 There may be an emerging international legal norm against polyg-
amy, with roots that extend back several decades. Early articulations of the
international right to religious freedom made clear that this right did not encom-
pass polygamy; that is, that there was no affirmative right to polygamy.235 Po-
lygamy was identified as a threat to women's internationally-protected legal
rights in a seminal 1976 article on sex discrimination by Professor Myres Mc-
Dougal?36 In the United States, an organized movement of Mormon women
has emerged opposing the continued practice of polygamy in some enclaves,
despite its ban by the Utah state constitution and the laws of all fifty states?3?
Where states allow polygamy but not polyandry (as per Islamic law), they vio-
late the basic principle against sex discrimination contained in Article 16(1) of
CEDAW.238 That Article further declares that there must be equality in the
marital relationship.239 In addition, polygamy may be harmful to children, espe-
cially when, as in France, it results in extremely crowded living conditions, po-
tentially violating the "best interests" standards of the Convention on the Rights
231. Ministere de I'Interieur, supra note 223 (citing specifically the decision in Prefet du Cal-
vados, Oct. 2, 1996).
232. [d. (citing Conseil Constitutionnel Decision No. 93-325 DC, Aug. 13, 1993) (translated
from French).
233. [d.
234. But see Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband's Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A31
(arguing, based on her own experience in a polygamous household in Utah, that polygamy is good
for women, helping them to balance a career with family).
235. See Carol Weisbrod, Universals and Particulars: A Comment on Women's Human Rights
and Religious Marriage Contracts, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 77, 80 (1999).
236. Myres McDougal et aI., Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Outlaw-
ing ofSex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J.INT'L L. 497, 506 (1975); see also Weisbrod, supra note
235, at 80-81.
237. See generally http://www.polygamy.org (last visited May 2, 2003); http://www.poly
gamyinfo.comlfrontdoor.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
238. See Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's Con-
vention in the Law as Stipulated in Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1,30 (1995).
239. See also Khaliq, supra note 238, at 3 I.
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of the Child. Finally, even if none of these harms are inherent in the concept of
polygamy, the practice in much of the world has been compared to slavery.24o
Women and quite young girls are often forced into polygamous marriages,
sometimes after having been sold at auctions.241
Thus, there are strong interests, cognizable at international law, that weigh
against a norm in favor of keeping polygamous families intact. Yet these factors
must be balanced against the human right to family integrity. As those immi-
grants whose homes the loi Pasqua broke apart can attest, the forcible separation
of families is usually emotionally traumatizing for all members and frequently
brings harsh economic and social consequences. This is especially true when
such separation results in deportation.
International law recognizes a right against arbitrary deportation. The de-
portation of women as a response to their husbands' practice of polygamy may
well be considered arbitrary, particularly given the law's retroactive application.
As French jurist Emmanuelle Andrez and sociologist Alexis Spire have stated,
"[IJt is indisputable that polygamy must be combated as a practice that is hostile
to the dignity of women and contrary to the equality of the sexes. But instead of
protecting women in polygamous situations, the legislature chose to penalize
them.,,242
A more general concern underlies the debate about polygamy: what limits,
if any, does international law place on the state's ability to define what consti-
tutes a legitimate family? This concern has applications far beyond the sphere
of immigration. A government's legal recognition of a marriage or other family
relationship generally brings a range of legal and practical advantages, often
including taxation, welfare, private and public benefits eligibility, child custody,
inheritance, and many others. To what extent may a state determine what rela-
tionships may be granted these advantages, thus discriminating against family
arrangements that diverge from the societal norm? An obvious contemporary
example of such a dilemma is the debate over same-sex marriage. Should states
be required to authorize such marriages domestically or at least to recognize the
validity of those that have been legally performed abroad? Most advocates of
same-sex marriage do not endorse polygamy, just as most polygamists do not
support same-sex marriage.243 But is there a principled way to distinguish be-
tween the two for the purpose of developing international legal norms?244 We
return to this issue below.245
240. Weisbrod, supra note 235. at 95.
241. Simons. supra note 189.
242. Andrez & Spire, supra note 203 (translated from French).
243. Chambers, supra note 174, at 74, 79-80 (noting that Mormon doctrine views homosexual-
ity as sinful, while most advocates of same-sex marriage have taken pains to distinguish it from
polygamy).
244. See generally Jorge Martin. English Polygamy Law and the Danish Registered Partnership
Act: A Case for the Consistent Treatment of Foreign Polygamous Marriages and Danish Same-Sex
Marriages in England, 27 CORNELL !NT'L L.J. 419 (1994) (arguing that because England recognizes
polygamous marriages of immigrants legally married abroad, it should apply same standard to for-
eign same-sex partnerships).
245. See infra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
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In the immigration context, concerns for sovereignty and international com-
ity complicate the issue. International law recognizes that states have the sover-
eign right to exclude aliens, although this right is subject to a number of
limitations such as certain non-discrimination principles, due process rights, and
perhaps a concern for familial integrity?46 This right arguably provides states
with the authority to require immigrants, as a condition of entry or of residence,
to comply with policies that reflect national cultural norms. On the other hand,
international comity principles generally encourage states to give effect to mar-
riages and other legal acts perfonued in other countries. From this perspective,
France's lack of recognition of a Senegalese polygamous marriage is an affront
not just to the family concerned but to Senegal itself. French choice-of-law
rules generally do measure the validity of marriages (and other legal acts related
to families) performed abroad according to the laws of an immigrant's country
of nationality.247 This principle (known as statut personnel) is grounded partly
in comity concerns and partly in deference to the individual in matters of his or
her private life?48 Against the background of this legal rule, the anti-polygamy
law is an anomaly.
Finally, the situation of polygamous immigrants is complicated by concerns
. for the accommodation of cultural difference. African women in France face a
number of different but interlocking forms of oppression: racial, cultural, gen-
der-based, and socioeconomic. Western feminism has frequently and notori-
ously failed to approach gender issues with an adequate understanding of the
problems and perspectives of Third World women (as well as Western women
of color).249 The need to account for different fonus of oppression is not merely
a matter for feminist theorizing; it is of tremendous practical importance. In the
French polygamy example, legitimate concerns about gender inequality gave
rise to an immigration policy that ultimately facilitated the further subordination
of a racial and cultural minority group, in many cases literally throwing women
and children out on the streets.
At the same time, however, an appreciation of cultural difference should
not blind us to the forms of subjugation that take place within cultures?50 In
France, it was African women who first brought attention to the problems wo-
men and children face in polygamous families. Aided by these advocates, many
other African women in France who may previously have been afraid to raise
their voices now have shared stories of the indignities they have suffered in
polygamous households.251 A truly intersectional analysis of discriminatory so-
246. These limitations are explored in Section II.C.
247. Andrez & Spire, supra note 203; Bissuel, supra note 186.
248. See Andrez & Spire, supra note 203.
249. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, LatCrit Theory: Some Preliminary Notes Towards a
Transatlantic Dialogue, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMPo L. REv. I, 23-25 (2001).
250. See Leti Volpp, (Mis)ldentifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994) (critiquing the relativistic application of the "cultural defense" to
excuse violence against women, and arguing instead for an intersectional analysis that accounts for
cultural difference as well as subordination within cultures and the existence of multiple interpreta-
tions of what norms a given "culture" embraces).
251. See Simons, supra note 189.
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cial structures must give heavy weight to these concerns.252 The question, then,
is how to address them without making things worse.
5. Equality and Family Formation: Legitimacy of Restrictions on
Polygamous Marriage
We believe France's enforcement of the loi Pasqua should be considered a
violation of international legal norms against family separation, primarily be-
cause the law's retroactive application fails to respect family members' auton-
omy interests in maintaining their existing family relationships. But this claim
should not be understood to mean that French law may not make any distinc-
tions between polygamous and monogamous marriages, nor that France must
authorize the performance of polygamous marriages. There is a meaningful dis-
tinction between laws limiting the formation of families and those that require
the separation of families that are already formed. For the most part, we believe
international law does and should give states considerable leeway in determining
what constitutes a legally cognizable family. Because conceptions of the family
vary so much among and within cultures, it is necessary to allow each nation to
develop its own evolving consensus regarding what types of relationships should
be granted the legal advantages that attach to marriage or other familial ties. It
is unreasonable to expect states to grant these advantages to all groups of people
who self-identify as families, no matter how loose their connections to one
another.253
We do think, however, that international law places limits on the latitude of
states in this regard.254 For example, international law clearly forbids states to
ban interracial marriages?55 We would like to see the evolution of an interna-
tional legal prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, in-
cluding discrimination against same-sex marriages or partnerships; we
recognize, however, that today such a norm is a long way off. On the other
hand, we believe that international law properly does not require states to recog-
nize polygamous marriages, and, in fact, there may be an evolving international
norm against polygamy.
252. See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 250.
253. For example, in one Australian Aboriginal society, "a Manitjamaat woman with a
Wardangmaat mother and a Manitjamaat father would accept all Wardangmaat women as 'mother'
and all Manitjamaat men as 'father.'" Lynch, supra note 131, at 522 (critiquing the "dominant
conception of 'parent' "). While this is a perfectly legitimate cultural practice, it would probably be
unworkable for another country to use such broad and culturally contingent definitions of family
relationships for the purposes of immigration policy. But cf James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander
Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solu-
tion-Oriented Protection, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 174 (1997) (arguing that government policies
for the reunification of refugee families frequently inappropriately exclude extended families, and
that they should use a "functional" criterion for what constitutes a family rather than relying on
arbitrary categories such as "spouses" and "children").
254. In the Cziffra case, the Human Rights Committee held that a state's definition of a family,
although it could be culturally specific, must be "without discrimination." See VAN BUEREN, supra
note 17, at 69.
255. See CERD, supra note 23, art. 5 (prohibiting race, ethnicity, and national origin discrimi-
nation in "the right to marry and the choice of spouse").
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The distinction is grounded in equality considerations. Although polygamy
and same-sex marriage are similar in the sense that they are both deviations
from "normal" Western family structure, in other senses they are quite different.
Polygamy tends to support women's subordination within the family and in so-
ciety at large. Same-sex marriage, on the other hand, is a partial solution to the
subordination of gays and lesbians; it tends to promote equality rather than to
undermine it. Neither domestic nor international law can or should be value-
neutral with respect to family formation, and we believe that the promotion of
equality norms should be one central guiding value. Such an approach would be
consistent with the widespread adoption of international legal norms against dis-
crimination, which have sometimes been interpreted to encompass discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation in areas other than marriage.256
France, therefore, has the right under international law not to recognize
polygamous marriages performed within its borders. The question regarding its
treatment of polygamous immigrants, however, hinges on France's obligation
(or lack thereof) to recognize these marriages when they are validly performed
abroad. This question, which cuts to the central problem with the loi Pasqua, is
the focus of the remainder of this Section.
6. Separation of Polygamous Families as a Violation of International
Law
When immigrants are already married before their arrival in France, an
immigration policy that disrupts these marriages involuntarily separates existing
families rather than simply restricting family formation. The legitimacy of this
involuntary family separation can in tum be separated into three distinct ques-
tions regarding France's specific international obligations. First, may France,
consistently with international law, refuse to allow polygamous families to im-
migrate in the first place; more specifically, may it refuse to issue spousal visas
and benefits to more than one wife of each male immigrant? Second, if it may
do this, is it nonetheless precluded from revoking the visas and benefits (and
otherwise forcing the separation) of polygamous families that were already ad-
mitted to France before the anti-polygamy policy was adopted? .Third, if it is so
precluded, must it also continue to allow entry to the additional wives and chil-
dren of polygamous men who immigrated before the policy was adopted?
As to the first question, it should be noted that France's new policy of
excluding polygamous families (or, more precisely, refusing to consider them to
be families for immigration purposes) is not at all unusual. Many Western coun-
tries, including the United States, refuse to recognize polygamous marriages
256. See Mouta, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1055 (holding that sexual orientation discrimination in child
custody decisions violates Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention, taken together); Toonen v.
Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 50th Sess., Communcation No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. U.N.
Doc CCPRIC/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination violates the pro-
hibition of sex discrimination under Article 26 of the ICCPR); Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 25186/94, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep C.D. 22 (1997) (Commission report) (holding that differences in
age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual sex violate Articles 8 and 14 taken together).
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even when they are validly perfonned abroad?57 We believe that these policies
are, and should be, pennissible under internationallaw?58 The right to set con-
ditions for immigration is a sovereign state right, subject only to the limits found
in particular international legal prohibitions; these conditions are presumptively
legitimate.259 While international law prohibits certain fonns of discrimination
in immigration policy (racial discrimination, most clearly), no such nonn exists
proscribing discrimination against polygamous families. If anything, as dis-
cussed above, international law may encourage this form of discrimination.
Immigration policy ought to be subject to an international nonn against
involuntary family separation, as we argue further in Section H.C. But this norm
ought not to be interpreted so rigidly as to prohibit any policy that places bur-
dens on families that wish to stay together. In this case, would-be immigrants
who are told that France will not recognize their marriages and will therefore not
allow more than one spouse to immigrate have an obvious option that will allow
their families to stay intact: they can stay in their home country. This option is
obviously not ideal; however, international law does not afford any person a
right to live in the country of his or her choice.26o Unless we are ready to
demand that all nations open their borders to unrestricted immigration, countries
will continue to turn away millions of would-be immigrants each year based on
any number of reasons. The strong equality concerns underlying opposition to
polygamy constitute valid reasons for exclusion.
The second and third questions posed above, however, bring us to the cen-
tral problem with the anti-polygamy provisions of the loi Pasqua: their retroac-
tivity. Once immigrants are admitted to a country, they acquire rights that they
did not have before they came, and they may not be deported arbitrarily or with-
out due process of law.261 Once immigrants have arrived in France, they are
entitled to respect for the basic integrity of their families. It is in this respect
that French law violates international norms against family separation. Even
though France retains the right to control the legal creation of marriages (and
other non-biological family relationships), its obligations under international
law, including Article 8 of the European Convention and other existing provi-
sions discussed in Section I, should be interpreted to obligate it to accommodate
situations where people's practical reality does not match the legal fictions sur-
rounding the definition of "family."
257. Simons, supra note 189; see also. e.g., Jean Pineau, L'ordre public dans les relations de
famille, 40 C. de D. 323, 332 (1999) (Canada); Gonzalez & Mac Bride, supra note 176, at 179
(Spain); id. at n.1 06 (Germany). However, Britain recognizes the validity of polygamous marriages
performed overseas. Martin, supra note 244, at 420, 424.
258. French opponents of the loi Pasqua generally recognize the legitimacy of its prospective
application. See. e.g., Alaux, supra note 206.
259. See. e.g., Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80,9473/81,9474/81,7 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 471 'j[ 67 (1985) (holding that State's right to "control the entry of non-nationals" is a
matter of "well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations").
260. See id. 'j['j[ 61, 68 (holding that Article 8' s protections of family life "cannot be considered
as extending to a general obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by
married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence").
261. See. e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 13.
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The need for a flexible, substantive approach to defining "family life"
under Article 8-one that focuses on the real strength of the ties between peo-
ple-has already been endorsed by the European Commission on Human Rights
in Khan v. United Kingdom, a decision involving the protection of polygamous
families. 262 Polygamous families are, in short, families. They are made up of
mothers and fathers-and children, who have a strong and internationally recog-
nized interest in growing up with both of their parents. Although France may
legitimately attempt to prevent people from fonning such families, or from
bringing them to the country, once they have already done so with the full un-
derstanding that France would respect their right to stay together, France may
not force them apart.
For this reason, we believe that the loi Pasqua violates international law
when applied to polygamous families already present in France before its pas-
sage. Specifically, it violates the right to respect for family life protected by the
European Convention on Human Rights and other international conventions; it
also may violate the right to marry, though not under the ECHR's restrictive
interpretations, as well as the individual rights of parents and children reflected
in various treaties?63
In addition, the loi Pasqua's prospective application to families is problem-
atic when the husband, but not one or more of the wives, immigrated prior to the
law's passage. In France, it has traditionally been very common for a man to
immigrate first, then bring his family once he has found work and housing and
acquired visas for them. None of the measures France has passed to soften the
law's blow do anything to help such families. These situations impose perhaps
somewhat less of a hardship on families than does the entirely retroactive appli-
cation discussed above, because they do not require families to uproot them-
selves but simply to stay separated as they already were. In another sense,
however, the burden is much more severe, because it requires families to be
separated entirely by national borders (usually on different continents) rather
than simply maintaining two separate households in the same city. Moreover,
polygamous men who arrived in France prior to 1993 had the legitimate expec-
tation that they would be able to take advantage of the laws enabling familial
immigration.
Therefore, we believe that, in situations where the marriages in question as
well as the husband's immigration preceded the passage of the loi Pasqua, its
enforcement violates the international norm against family separation. Where
the marriage occurred subsequent to the law's passage, however (even when the
husband immigrated first), no similar legitimate expectation of the right to fam-
ily integrity would exist, and the situation should be treated similarly to that of
whole families who have not yet immigrated. Enforcing the law against such
262. See VAN BUEREN. supra note 17, at 70 (discussing this case); Khan v. United Kingdom,
App. Nos. 2991/66, 2292/66, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 478 (1967) (Euro. Comm'n on H.R).
263. See supra Part I; see also Oyog, supra note 199 (citing argument of the immigrants' rights
group GISTI that the loi Pasqua violates two aspects of this protection: "the right to live with one's
spouse and the right to protect the family from breaking apart").
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marriages would have the benefit of discouraging the rightly decried practice of
men returning to Africa and acquiring additional wives without the permission
or knowledge of their first wives living in France.264
The ultimate difference between the retroactive and prospective applica-
tions of the anti-polygamy policy is grounded in their different implications for
the subjective autonomy interests of the family members' concerns. When men
and women today choose to immigrate to France despite their knowledge of its
anti-polygamy policy, they make a conscious decision to accept that limitation
on their family lives as a condition of immigration, or to stay in their countries
of origin in order to pursue the family arrangements of their choice. In contrast,
when they have immigrated on the understanding that their family relationships
will be allowed to remain intact, a sudden change in this policy that forces them
to abruptly change their situation or be deported does not adequately respect the
autonomy of any of the family members.
Clearly, in instances where women or girls have been forced into polyga-
mous marriages or otherwise wish to escape them, this notion of autonomy may
be illusory. France should make every effort to identify such cases and to give
the women involved a chance to make a meaningful choice; such possibilities
will be discussed further at the end of this section. But it is too simplistic, and
too disrespectful of the actual choices some women make, to assume that all
choices to enter polygamous marriages are inherently coerced. Cultural condi-
tioning in favor of certain marriage arrangements is not the same as forcible
marriage from a legal or moral perspective. Women's freely expressed choices
should not be disregarded simply because they occur against a background of
cultural norms that are inconsistent with principles of equality. Women's lives
(like men's) are made up not just of principles, but of people and relationships,
and to sacrifice these on the altar of abstract principle after women have chosen
and structured their lives around them is no vision of true autonomy.
In addition to its retroactivity, certain features of the French anti-polygamy
policy are particularly harsh and uncompassionate, to such an extent that they
may raise concerns under internationallaw.265 First, the policy requires physi-
cal separation of families, not simply legal divorce or annulment of marriages.
As a matter of simple freedom of association, this seems problematic. Con-
senting adults in France are generally permitted to live with whomever they like,
and today many families consist of unmarried parents and/or half-siblings from
different marriages or relationships. A policy that restricts this freedom should
264. See Simons, supra note 189 (describing the practice of men going home "to buy new,
young brides, often still teen-agers."); Richard Grenier, Polygamy and Multiculturalism the French
Way, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 1,1993, at A17 (criticizing African practice of marketing wives to
be sent to France, where they will be accorded "a pitiable social standing barely distinguishable from
slavery"). Grenier accuses African men in France of buying wives as an investment in future wel-
fare benefits; we believe that this characterization is largely unfair, and echoes the stereotypes being
propagated by the xenophobic French right wing in the early 1990s. See supra notes 201-203 and
accompanying text. Still, to the extent that his description of wives being sold at auction is accurate,
see Simons, supra note 189, the practice it describes should be eradicated.
265. See Polygamie: mieux vaut tard ... , supra note 226 (describing the enforcement method
of the loi Pasqua as 'blind" and "without nuance," and the measures themselves as "demagogic").
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raise concerns, particularly when applied disproportionately against certain im-
migrant groups. If France does not prohibit unmarried people from living to-
gether generally, it should not prohibit African immigrants from doing so on the
mere basis that they had been married in a different country. Although France
need not grant legal advantages to those foreign marriages, it should not impose
disadvantages on them that would not apply if the couple had never married at
all.
Second, the enforcement mechanisms of the loi Pasqua are arbitrary and
irrational, since they harm the very people the law was ostensibly designed to
help.266 Deportation is a terribly severe punishment that wreaks havoc on peo-
ple's lives. After families acquire jobs and housing, enroll their children in
school, and otherwise build ties to their new communities, deportation forces
them to leave all that behind and return to a country to which they may have cut
all ties. The trauma of deportation-perhaps most of all for children-is even
graver when it results in the separation of families?67 Deportation should not
be used as a threat to coerce families living in a country to separate from one
another-nor, for that matter, should the revocation of work permits and the
termination of welfare benefits. Parents should not be forced to choose between
abandoning their families and throwing them into economic ruin.
Finally, notwithstanding the problems with the current policy, France can
and should undertake other, non-punitive measures to alleviate the harms suf-
fered by women and children in polygamous households. Some African wo-
men's groups are already making such efforts-for example, providing
counseling for women and helping them to find jobs and housing if they choose
to leave their marriages voluntarily?68 No reasonable principle of international
law would forbid voluntary family separation. Women (and men) who want to
leave bad marriages, whether polygamous or otherwise, should have the right to
do so. France may need to alter its policy to make this easier. For example,
many African women's groups in France are working to eliminate the system of
derivative rights, under which married women's residency and work permits and
social benefits are actually issued to their husbands.269 Some groups have re-
quested the European Parliament to mandate that states issue permits directly to
women, "which would make them much less vulnerable in cases of divorce or
spousal abuse.,,27o In the special case of polygamous immigrants, where the
women often face both misery in their marriages and significant cultural and
economic obstacles to divorce, governments should make a special effort to en-
able those who want to escape polygamy to do so.
266. Alaux, supra note 206 (stating, in French, that "the struggle against polygamy, in its cur-
rent form, hurts almost exclusively the victims of polygamy").
267. We will explore this issue further in our discussion of U.S. immigration law in the next
Section.
268. See Henley, supra note 187 (citing work of Afrique Partenaire Service); Simons, supra
note 189 (describing support group meetings).
269. Scales-Trent, supra note 189, at 734.
270. [d. at 735.
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The problem of anti-polygamy laws in France provides a useful example
for the development of international legal norms against involuntary family sep-
aration. Unlike the Australian child removal policy discussed in Section A, the
polygamy situation presents a "hard case" for international law because the vari-
ous legally cognizable and important values and interests at stake tug in opposite
directions. Women's interests in structural gender equality and in being pro-
tected individually from oppressive or coerced polygamous marriages weigh in
favor of France's policy, while the values of family integrity, economic and
social stability for immigrants, respect for cultural difference, and respect for the
(arguably) autonomous choices of family members weigh against it. None of
these concerns can be disregarded, but balances must be struck and hard choices
must be made. We believe that these choices should be guided by an under-
standing of the intersectional nature both of the cultural life of the immigrant
women whose protection is, at least ostensibly, the goal of these policies, and of
the various forms of oppression they face.
Ultimately, when a policy is supposed to protect women, it is essential to
analyze its likely and actual outcomes realistically. A policy that results in im-
migrant women being thrown out on the streets ought not to be praised by femi-
nists. Whatever abstract principles are at play in the shaping of international
legal norms, they need to be adapted to this reality. A stronger recognition of
international norms against family separation, and an understanding of how
those norms can actually help women, might prevent states from jumping into
major policy changes like France's without fully considering their ramifications
for the individuals and the families they affect.
C. Family Interests and Exceptional Hardship in United States
Immigration Law
Beyond the particular circumstances of polygamous immigrants, interna-
tionallegal protection of family integrity has broad implications for immigration
law. This Section analyzes the ways that United States immigration law does
and does not accommodate the rights and interests of families. In particular, we
argue that provisions of two 1996 laws restricting the consideration of family
hardship in deportation proceedings, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRlRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), violate the United States' international obligations to
protect families.271 United States courts have traditionally been notoriously re-
luctant to incorporate international norms into their interpretation of domestic
laws?72 However, two recent federal district court decisions by Judge Jack
Weinstein, enjoining deportations on international law grounds, break this mold,
and in fact contain quite detailed assessments of the United States' obligations to
271. Pub. L. 104-208, Div.C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Pub. L. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
272. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law: Predic-
tions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REv. 417, 417-20 (2000) (suggesting that a change in U.S.
courts' insularity may be approaching).
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protect families and children?73 We draw heavily on this analysis and argue
that other courts should similarly integrate these international law requirements
into their review of immigration and removal decisions. In addition, we com-
pare these decisions to those of the European Court of Human Rights, which has
developed a relatively robust jurisprudence regarding the limitations interna-
tional law places on immigration decisions that separate families.
1. U.S. Immigration Law's Treatment of the Family
U.S. immigration law has traditionally required that exclusion and removal
decisions take family integrity into account, yet even before the 1996 reforms,
concerns for the family were frequently subordinated to other concerns,z74 In
most circumstances, U.S. immigration law favors spouses of U.S. citizens, who
are entitled to visas and eventually permanent resident status provided that they
do not fall into certain categories of inadmissible aliens. The Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 set forth both bases for inadmissibility-includ-
ing, for example, some criminal convictions-as well as criteria for waivers of
inadmissibility decisions.275 A typical example of these waiver provisions was
Section 212(c), which, before its repeal in 1996 as part of the IIRIRA, provided
for discretionary waivers of inadmissibility decisions for lawful permanent re-
sidents who, after traveling abroad, were denied the right to return to the United
States. In deciding whether to grant these waivers, immigration judges were
required to "balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a
permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his
behalf to determine whether the granting of section 212(c) relief appears in the
best interests of this country.,,276 Family ties in the United States, as well as
hardship to the family that would result if the alien was deported, were among
the relevant "social and humane considerations" to be evaluated?77
However, even a simple reading of the text of section 212(c) demonstrates
that it never provided a very robust protection of family integrity. The alien
bore the burden of proving he or she met the criteria for the waiver; the default
presumption was in favor of family separation, not against it. In addition, the
harm of family separation was measured only in terms of its effect on "the best
interest of this country," not on that of the alien. The distinction is important
because international human rights limitations on immigration proceedings are
primarily oriented toward the protection of the individual immigrant. The INA
273. See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.
Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
274. See, e.g., Enid Trucios-Haynes, "Family Values" i990's Style: U.S. immigration Reform
Proposals and the Abandonment of the Family, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 241, 241 (1998) (citing the
"longstanding family unity goals reflected in immigration law").
275. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 182-89
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182); see Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (Bd. of
Immigration Appeals 1978).
276. Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
277. id. at 584-85.
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waiver provisions, even pre-1996, took into account family ties not as an indi-
vidual right, but as simply one measure of U.S. interests.278
Pursuant to INA Section 240A, the cancellation of removal provision, Sec-
tion 212(c) waiver proceedings were also available to most aliens facing depor-
tation proceedings?79 This provision allowed the Attorney General (in practice,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA» to stop any deportation so long as the
alien met certain "residency and character requirements" and could show that
the deportation would cause "extreme hardship" to himself or to U.S. citizen or
legal permanent resident family members?80 BIA decisions are subject to re-
view by federal appellate courts, which at first tended frequently to overturn
denials of the waiver on the basis that the BIA had interpreted the "extreme
hardship" requirement too stringently?81 Specifically, some courts placed em-
phasis on family unity, holding that family separation alone may constitute ex-
treme hardship and that family ties are the single most important factor in a
hardship deterrnination?82 In INS v. Wang, however, the Supreme Court re-
versed an appellate decision that had overturned a BIA waiver decision?83 The
Court held that the INA granted broad discretion to the BIA in making waiver
decisions, and that the courts must therefore defer to administrative interpreta-
tions of "extreme hardship," which are reviewable only on the basis of abuse of
discretion?84 Even with this limited review authority, some court decisions in
the wake of Wang nonetheless ordered the BIA to increase the weight given to
the harms of family separation in its balancing of interests.285
As limited as it has always been, the availability of hardship waivers for
immigrants facing deportation orders has decreased in the wake of IIRIRA and
AEDPA. First, both bills greatly increase the range of criminal offenses defined
as "aggravated felonies," for which immigrants, even lawful permanent re-
278. Similar waiver provisions existed throughout the INA, and still exist, though many have
been modified by the 1996 reforms. For example, Section 212(e) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182,
provides for discretionary waivers of rules prohibiting foreign students in certain exchange programs
from applying for permanent resident status after completion of the program until after they have
returned to their host countries for two years. See Inna V. Tachkalova, Comment, The Hardship
Waiver of the Two-Year Foreign Residency Requirement Under Section 2I2(e) ofthe INA: The Need
for a Change, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 549,558-65 (1999) (describing and critiquing U.S. courts' narrow
interpretation of section 212(e), which like section 212(c) is focused on U.S. interests, taking into
account the interests of American family members but not those of the alien herself). Courts inter-
preting this section have imposed a limiting interpretation of "exceptional hardship," holding that
"separation of families by itself never will qualify as exceptional hardship because temporary sepa-
ration from a spouse is a problem that many families face." Id. at 563.
279. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247, 1248 (codified at 8 U.S.c.
§ 1229b (2003)).
280. Susan L. Kamlet, Comment, Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship" in Suspension of
Deportation Cases, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 175, 175 (1984).
281. /d. at 176.
282. Mejia-Carillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981); Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352,
1357 (9th Cir. 1980).
. 283. 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam).
284. Id.
285. E.g., Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19,20 (1st Cir. 1983); Contreras-Buenfil v. INS,
712 F.2d 401,403-04 (9th Cir. 1983); see Kamlet, supra note 280, at 199-200.
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sidents, are automatically subject to deportation?86 AEDPA also excludes all
aggravated felons from consideration for any sort of hardship waiver, and immu-
nizes their deportation orders from judicial review.287
Other provisions of the IIRIRA also threaten family integrity. For exam-
ple, Section 2l2(a)(9) bars persons who have been present illegally in the United
States for one year or more from applying for permanent resident status at any
time in the next ten years?88 Because many undocumented immigrants have
legal resident family members-for example, their children born on American
soil are U.S. citizens-these policies pose a major danger of family separa-
tion.289 Undocumented immigrants must continue to hide from authorities in
order to avoid this risk. There is no exception for immigrants who marry U.S.
citizens, a major change from long-standing policy; indeed, there are no waivers
at al1.290 Similarly, Section 245(i) repealed a provision that enabled undocu-
mented immigrants to acquire visas without first returning to their home coun-
tries; essentially, this provision prevents these immigrants from legalizing their
status even temporarily?91
2. Consistency of u.s. Immigration Policy with International Law
Relating to Family Separation: Recent Court Decisions
Various aspects of U.S. immigration law, especially post-1996, may be in-
consistent with international legal norms against family separation. Interna-
tionallaw has traditionally recognized a sovereign right to exclude and deport
aliens?92 This right, however, is limited by countervailing provisions of inter-
national law?93 For example, a number of human rights conventions require
that deportees be provided with various procedural protections?94 Some require
that proceedings be individualized, specifically banning mass expulsion?95 Ex-
ile of citizens, or restrictions on their right of return, is banned.296 Immigration
policy may not discriminate on the basis of illicit factors such as race?97 No
specific human rights treaty provision bans separation of families through depor-
tation. However, the general treaty provisions protecting family integrity, those
protecting child welfare, and the customary international norms that they re-
present all implicate the legality of immigration policies that separate families.
286. See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d. 206, 209-10 (1999).
287. Id. at 212.
288. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000).
289. See Emma O. Guzman, Comment, The Dynamics of the Illega/lmmigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: The Splitting-Up ofAmerican Families, 2 SCHOLAR 95, 121-
23 (2000).
290. 8 U.S.c. § 1182.
291. See Guzman, supra note 289, at 123-25.
292. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Dalia v. France,
1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 76, 'I! 52.
293. See Dalia, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 76'11 52.
294. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 13; American Convention, supra note 25, art. 22.
295. American Convention, supra note 25, art. 22(9); African Charter, supra note 25, art. 12.
296. E.g., American Convention, supra note 25, art. 22(5); African Charter, supra note 25, art.
12.
297. CERD, supra note 22, art. 5(d)(i)-(ii).
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For example, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has recognized that deporta-
tion can interfere with family life in violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR.298
Accordingly, Congress and administrators should take care that they comply
with these international norms when designing and implementing immigration
policies, as should the courts in interpreting and reviewing them.
In a groundbreaking decision in 1999, the Eastern District of New York did
just that, overturning a BIA deportation order on international law grounds. Ma-
ria v. McElroy dealt with a challenge to a BIA decision that the petitioner, Eddy
Maria, was deportable pursuant to the IIRIRA's provisions regarding aggravated
felons. 299 Maria, a 24-year-old citizen of the Dominican Republic, had lived in
the U.S. continuously since the age of ten and was a lawful permanent resident.
His parents were U.S. citizens, as were some of his siblings.Joo In 1996, Maria
was convicted of attempted unarmed robbery in the second degree, an offense
that the AEDPA redefined as an "aggravated felony" when it was passed later
that year. The INS began deportation proceedings against him and held a hear-
ing in 1997. After serving his two-year sentence, Maria was immediately taken
into INS custody.JOl The BIA approved the INS decision on the basis that Ma-
ria "had been convicted of an 'aggravated felony' and was thus both deportable
and ineligible for any form of relief from deportation.,,302 Although the
AEDPA barred direct judicial review, Maria filed a petition for habeas corpus in
district court.J°3 .
Although denying Maria's request to be declared non-deportable, the court
held that he was entitled to a humanitarian hearing allowing consideration of his
claim to a hardship waiver. Specifically, the court held that to deport Maria
without a hardship hearing would violate a number of principles of international
law preventing interference with family life.304 The court gave a particularly
detailed analysis of the provisions of the ICCPR, including Article 23(1)'s state-
ment that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State" and Article 17's establishment of
an individual right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with the farnily.3°S
Citing decisions by the Human Rights Committee, the court held that deporta-
tion proceedings that do not take family separation into account violate these
principles, and also may constitute "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" in
violation of Article 7.306
298. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. GAOR, Hum Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No.
40, Annex 13, at 134, U.N. Doc. N36/40 (1981). In addition, Article 19(6) of the Convention on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights requires states to ''facilitate as far as possible the reunion of
the family of a foreign worker" who has legally migrated, while the 1977 European Convention on
the Legal Status of Migrant Workers provides similar protections for migrant workers' families.
DETRICK, supra note 48, at 186-87.
299. 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219-20 (1999).
300. [d. at 213.
301. [d. at 215.
302. [d.
303. [d.
304. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 231-34.
305. [d. at 231.
306. [d. at 231-32.
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In addition, the court held that customary international law prohibited arbi-
trary expulsion and arbitrary interference with family life.307 Judge Weinstein
cited a range of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the three regional human rights conventions, as well as U.S.
Supreme Court decisions recognizing a domestic constitutional right to family
integrity.308 He held that the denial of a humanitarian hearing to establish hard-
ship-at which the impact of family separation could be raised and consid-
ered-made the expulsion and interference with family life "arbitrary" within
the meaning of international law.3°9 Therefore, the court vacated the deporta-
tion decision and ordered that Maria be granted such a hearing.
The court in Maria stopped short of declaring that the AEDPA aggravat-
edfelony provisions violated international law. Rather, it followed the principle
of avoidance of conflict with international law by construing the statute nar-
rowly so as not to apply to Maria's particular case.3 l0 Specifically, the statute
was ambiguous as to whether the redefinition of aggravated felonies applied
retroactively to crimes committed before its passage. To avoid reaching the in-
ternational law issue, the court held that the statute was not retroactive, thus
exempting Maria from its provisions and entitling him to the hardship waiver to
which he would have been entitled prior to 1996.
In his more recent decision in Beharry v. Reno, Judge Weinstein again nar-
rowly construed the AEDPA aggravated felony provisions, this time in a case
where the conviction had occurred after AEDPA and IIRIRA were passed, but
the crime had been committed earlier.311 The petitioner, Don Beharry, was a
lawful permanent resident who had moved to the United States from Trinidad at
the age of seven; his six-year-old daughter and his sister were U.S. citizens.3 12
Beharry was convicted of second-degree robbery for helping a friend to steal
$714 from the cash register of the coffee shop where he worked.313 While he
was in prison, the INS initiated deportation proceedings, and the BIA held that
he was ineligible for hardship waivers.3 14 In overturning this decision, Judge
Weinstein relied on many of the same principles of customary and conventional
international law that formed the basis for the Maria holding. In addition, how-
ever, because Beharry had a U.S. citizen daughter, the court found that several
provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child applied. These included
the Preamble's general requirement for the "protection and assistance" of the
family, the Article 3 protection of the best interests of the child, and the Article
7 protection of the child's "right to know and be cared for by his or her par-
ents.'>3lS Although the United States has not ratified the Convention, the court
307. Id. at 232-33.
308. Id.
309. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
310. Id. at 231.
311. 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
312. Id. at 586.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 587.
315. Id. at 595.
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reasoned that its ratification by every other organized government in the world
demonstrated clearly that its prohibitions constitute customary international
law?16
The difficulty in Beharry was that under United States domestic law, all
provisions of international law may be statutorily overruled by Congress; where
domestic and international law unavoidably conflict, the last-in-time rule nor-
mallyapplies?l? But the court held that taken together, two competing princi-
ples-that Congress may override international law, but courts must construe
statutes to avoid conflicts-"create a principle of clear statement.',J18 Thus, "in
order to overrule customary international law, Congress must enact domestic
legislation which both postdates the development of a customary international
legal norm and which clearly has the intent of repealing that norm.',319 This
principle best ensures that court decisions will promote the compliance of the
United States with its international obligations. Because Congress, in passing
the immigration bills, did not unequivocally state its intention to override inter-
national law, Judge Weinstein construed the legislation to be in conformance
with it-that is, to allow hardship hearings in cases where family separation may
occur and where the underlying crime was committed prior to the statutory
change that defined it as an "aggravated felony." The court described this non-
retroactive construction as the "most narrowly targeted way to bring the INA
into compliance with international law.,,32o It remains to be seen whether the
rationale of Maria and Beharry will be applied to cases where application of the
AEDPA would be entirely non-retroactive. Given the international principles
discussed in the two cases, there is no apparent reason, other than a desire to
craft a narrow holding in these particular cases, that the hearing requirement
ought to hinge on retroactivity.
3. Approach of the European Court of Human Rights
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding family
separation in immigration proceedings provides an interesting comparison to
these American cases. Like Judge Weinstein, the ECHR has emphasized the
procedural protections available to persons being excluded or deported. In Ciliz
v. Netherlands, the Court held that a father's rights to a family life under Article
8 of the European Convention were violated by his immigration-related exclu-
sion from the country during proceedings concerning custody of his son and
visitation rightS. 321 Pursuant to Dutch policy, Ciliz had lost his right to stay in
the country as soon as he got divorced because his visa had been contingent on
his marriage to a Dutch resident. The European Commission on Human Rights,
in an opinion approved by the Court's decision, acknowledged the state's eco-
316. [d. at 600.
317. See 183 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900) and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(l)(a) (1987)).
318. [d. at 598-99.
319. [d.
320. [d. at 604.
321. Ciliz v. Netherlands, 2000-Vll Eur. Ct. H.R. 267.
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nomic interests in controlling immigration. It concluded, however, that because
Ciliz was excluded from critical proceedings concerning access to his son, "the
respondent State had failed to strike a fair balance between the interest of the
applicant and his son in continued contact and the general interest of the eco-
nomic well-being of the country.,,322 Therefore, the Court found a violation of
Article 8 and ordered the government to pay damages.
However, the European Court noted in Ciliz, that "the applicant was not
convicted of any criminal offences warranting his removal from the Nether-
lands.,,323 This distinction, though seemingly just an aside in Ciliz, is apparently
significant. In Dalia v. France, the Court approved the removal and permanent
exclusion of a woman who had been convicted of heroin trafficking, which it
described as a "scourge" with "devastating effects ... on people's lives.,,324
The Court held that this removal did not violate Article 8 notwithstanding the
fact that it separated Dalia permanently from her mother, seven siblings, and
French citizen son, as well as the country where she had lived for nineteen years.
The Court acknowledged that the woman's "family ties" were "essentially in
France," yet premised its decision on the extremely dubious ground that Dalia
still maintained "certain family relations" and social ties in Algeria, and there-
fore the removal did not effect a "drastic" interference with her family life.325
The Court also noted that Dalia had given birth to her child while illegally in
France after the initial removal order, which, in the Court's view, estopped her
from relying on this relationship in subsequent immigration proceedings.
The core of the Court's rationale, however, appears to have been the basic
proposition that
It is for the Contracting States to maintain public order, in particular by exercising
their right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their
treaty obligations, to control the entry and residence of aliens. To that end they
have the power to deport aliens convicted of criminal offences. However, their
decisions in this field must, in so far as they may interfere with a right protected
under paragraph I of Article 8, be necessary in a democratic society, that is to say
justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim pursued. . . . The Court's task accordingly consists in ascertaining
whether the refusal to lift the order in issue struck a fair balance between the
relevant interests, namely the applicant's right to respect for her private and fam-
ily life, on the one hand, and the prevention of disorder or crime, on the other.326
This type of balancing test has in other contexts led the Court to broad interpre-
tations of the Article 8 right to family 1ife.327 But in the immigration context,
any realistic assessment of the magnitude of the interference approved in Dalia
suggests that from the ECHR's perspective, any interference with family life is
justified when a cause the Court considers important, like the "scourge" of
322. [d. ')[ 55; see id. ')[ 71 (agreeing with the Commission's reasoning).
323. [d. 'i. 69.
324. Dalia, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 76 ')[54 (1998).
325. [d. 'II 53.
326. [d. 'II 52.
327. See, e.g., infra notes 369-380 and accompanying text (discussing ECHR review of child
welfare decisions).
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drugs, is involved. The fact that the Court downplayed the significance of the
interference, while not engaging in any analysis of whether this particular wo-
man's exclusion was truly "necessary" to the successful prosecution of France's
war on drugs, suggests the malleability of balancing tests; the Court did not
really engage in much balancing at all.328
4. Conclusions
The district court decisions in Maria and Beharry provide a paradigmatic
example of the effective incorporation of international legal norms against fam-
ily separation into U.S. immigration decisions. These norms may extend farther
than Judge Weinstein took them-that is, beyond the non-retroactive interpreta-
tion of immigration statutes and beyond the requirement of a humanitarian hear-
ing to a substantive command against family separation under at least some
circumstances. Some nations, such as France, as a general rule bar the deporta-
tion of aliens with citizen children;329 international law could reasonably be
interpreted to require such a rule. Stopping short of an absolute bar, interna-
tionallaw could specify that the state needs to meet a certain standard of justifi-
cation, such as a compelling state interest, for deporting aliens and thereby
separating them from their families. In any event, however, Maria and Beharry
go much further in the direction of implementing international protections of the
family than had any previous decision. Moreover, the hearing requirement
seems to strike a reasonable balance between the state's interests in deportations
and the alien's interests in family integrity-at least to the extent that the hear-
ings actually give meaningful consideration to the alien's interests. All in all, it
is too early to tell whether Judge Weinstein's rationale will ever be followed by
other United States courts; at least one has already rejected it based on a belief
that Congress overrode international law when it passed the immigration stat-
utes.330 Still, the decisions are an encouraging sign.
328. The ECHR's protections, if not totally effective, exceed those given to deportees by the
Human Rights Committee in its interpretation of the ICCPR. See Stewart v. Canada, U.N. Human
Rights Comm., 58th Sess., Communcation No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPRlCl581D1538/1993 (1996)
(upholding deportation of a person who had been convicted of a range of petty offenses even though
it meant separation from his whole family); see also Geraldine Van Bueren, Annual Review ofFam-
ily Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 1997 8 (Andrew Bainham ed. 1999) (dis-
cussing Stewart and comparing it to ECHR precedent).
329. As the case of the petitioner in Dalia indicates, this rule is apparently not applicable to
removals on the basis of criminal convictions. See supra notes 324-328 and accompanying text.
330. Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607-08 (M.D. Pa. 2000). This decision
predated Beharry, and thus did not specifically address the clear statement rule argument. Instead, it
assumed that Congress had abrogated international law, and held that this abrogation was not barred
by jus cogens principles. [d. at 608; see also Gonzales-Polanco v. INS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14303 at *1 (refusing to extend Beharry to a case where a non-lawful resident was convicted of a
drug crime).
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D. Family Integrity vs. Child Welfare: Protective Removal under
International Law
International norms against family separation have, naturally, significant
implications for family law and particularly for the involuntary removal of chil-
dren from their parents?3! The protection of children from abuse and neglect is
a legitimate and strong state interest that international law recognizes.332 This
interest sometimes requires the separation of families. However, international
law places some limits even on protective family separation. These limits are
grounded both in the rights of parents and in those of children, whose interests
may be ill served by some forms of supposedly protective removals. In this
section, we analyze these limits with respect to child welfare law in the United
States. We focus on a recent U.S. case that applies international law as a limit
on child welfare agencies' removal authority, and compare it with analogous
cases in the European Court of Human Rights. We believe this case study is
crucial, because the ultimate test of the viability of an international norm against
family separation is its ability to adapt to the situations where there is a good
argument that the family should be separated. Protective removal of children is
perhaps the core example of such a situation. Moreover, given that probably the
strongest and most specific international norms implicating family matters are
those that protect the rights and interests of the child, it will be essential for any
norm in favor of family unity to accommodate the strong, treaty-based preroga-
tive afforded to child protection.
1. Evolution of the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard
The prevailing legal standard for protective removal of children from their
parents in the United States is the "best interests of the child.,,333 This model,
which replaced an earlier parental rights focus, has evolved considerably over
the years. The "best interests" standard has been applied by courts in a wide
variety of contexts; its origins in child custody cases date back to the late nine-
teenth century.334 In the child welfare context, "best interests" analysis has long
drawn on the pioneering work during the 1960s by child psychologists Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit.335 As they conceived it, the model
placed heavy emphasis on the maintenance of a stable family environment.
Goldstein et al. argued that continuity in a child's surroundings and care was
331. See generally Dyer, supra note 3.
332. See supra Section I.B.2 (discussing the "best interests of the child" principle in interna-
tional law).
333. See, e.g., LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the "Best Interests of the
Child"Standard, 34 S.D. L. REv. 459 (1989).
334. See id. at 467-68 (tracing origins of the standard); see also Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650
(\881) (awarding custody over a child to the foster parent who raised her at her parents' request,
rather than to her biological father, on the basis of the child's interests); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y.
429 (1925) (holding that the state must act paternalistically to protect the child in child custody
disputes, rather than simply adjudicating the competing interests of the parents).
335. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN, & ANNA FREUD,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (\996) (a compilation
of J. Goldstein, Solnit, and Freud's earlier writings on the subject).
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crucial to his or her psychological and emotional development.336 Furthermore,
they found that healthy parent-child relationships are more likely to develop
when parents have considerable autonomy in their caretaking.337 The implica-
tion for governmental regul(l.tion of child welfare was a strong presumption
against intervention and removal, with removal justified only on the basis of
imminent risk of severe harm.338 Furthermore,
[t]he degree of intrusion on family integrity at each stage of decision [invocation
of state intervention, adjudication, and disposition] should be no greater than that
which is necessary to fulfill the function of the decision. . .. [N]o state intrusion
ought to be authorized unless probable and sufficient cause has been established
with limits prospectively and carefully defined by the legislature.339
Over the past several decades, the prominence of the "best interests" stan-
dard in child welfare law has varied, as has the prevailing approach to defining
those interests. In the 1970s, placement of children in foster care for long peri-
ods of time became common as authorities cracked down on abuse and neg-
lect.340 This system produced the increasingly criticized problem of "foster care
drift," as children often spent years in the foster care system without any con-
tinuity in care.341 Congress responded to this problem in 1980 with the passage
of the Child Welfare Act, the goal of which was to reduce the time children
spent in foster care.342 The Act emphasized family reunification, imposing for
the first time the requirement that social workers make "reasonable efforts" to-
ward reunification of separated families, as well as measures designed to prevent
removals initially.343 Another law passed in 1993, the Family Preservation and
Family Support Act, further emphasized the goal of reunification.344 However,
as family preservation policies, both of these laws were fairly unsuccessful.345
Children continued to languish in foster care,346 and at the same time, there
were a number of highly publicized tragedies in which children were returned to
336. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHiLD 31-34 (2d ed.
1979).
337. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHiLD 9 (1979).
338. Id. at 194-95.
339. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 336, at 97.
340. Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of Parental Rights: Solving a Problem or
Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 97, 97 (1999).
341. /d. at 97-98.
342. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No 96-272 (1980); see
Freundlich, supra note 340, at 98 (describing reasons for passage of the Act); Libby S. Adler, The
Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2-3 (2001).
343. See Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 375, 379 (2002); Adler, supra note 342, at 5.
344. Family Preservation and Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312; see
Freundlich, supra note 340, at 98.
345. See Freundlich, supra note 340, at 98-99 (stating that foster care populations "increased
significantly" during this period); Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child
Welfare Policy, 1 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'y 63, 65 (1999).
346. Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. CT. REv. 25, 25 (2001).
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violent homes pursuant to reunification policies and then killed.347 The outcry
surrounding these cases was a major impetus348 for Congress's passage in 1997
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA),349 which remains the maingov-
eming federal child welfare statute.
Often described as a "sea change" in child welfare law,35o ASFA "shifted
the priority of the child welfare system from family reunification to child protec-
tion.,,35t ASFA's main purpose was to facilitate adoption, which was viewed as
a better permanent solution for many children than family reunification.352
ASFA's centerpiece was a mandate that state authorities accelerate the timetable
for the involuntary termination of parental rights, a legal process that perma-
nently severs the parent-child relationship and clears the way for adoption.353
The provision requires states to initiate involuntary termination proceedings in
any case in which a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous
twenty-two months.
Although hailed by some as a potential safe solution to foster care drift,354
ASFA has also been criticized as unduly draconian. Critics have argued that this
hasty movement toward permanent separation of families risks emotional dam-
age to children, who may move to more stable adoptive families but lose the
lifelong loving relationships they have had with their biological parents.355
Moreover, the policy has a disparate impact on poor and minority families, an
effect exacerbated by the juxtaposition of ASFA with contemporaneous welfare
policy reforms that may force poor single mothers to place children in foster
care so that they can meet work requirements,356 as well as with harsh penalties
for drug and other crimes that make it impossible for imprisoned single parents
to keep their children out of foster care for the requisite number of months.357
Thus, a mother sentenced to fifteen months or more in prison for drug posses-
sion risks losing her child forever, without any showing of her unfitness as a
parent.358 Finally, critics of ASFA argue that past family reunification ap-
proaches failed not because of any basic flaw with reunification as a goal, but
347. Roberts, supra note 345, at 66.
348. Id.
349. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) [here-
inafter ASFA]; see Rachel Venier, Parental Rights and the Best Interests of the Child: Implications
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on Domestic Violence Victims' Rights, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 517, 517-18 (2000) (outlining the Act's provisions).
350. Freundlich, supra note 340, at 97.
351. Alison B. Vreeland, Note, The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York City: Spar-
ing the Child or Spoiling the Family?, 27 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1053, 1069 (2000); see also Moye &
Rinker, supra note 343, at 379-80.
352. See Adler, supra note 342, at 9 (noting that the CWA and ASFA shared the goal of perma-
nence but employed radically different strategies toward that goal).
353. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5).
354. E.g., Gendell, supra note 346.
355. Roberts, supra note 345, at 70-7 I.
356. Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 AN-
NALS 79, 87 (2001); Moye & Rinker, supra note 343, at 387.
357. Mariely Downey, Losing More than Time: Incarcerated Mothers and the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 41 (2001).
358. See id. at 47.
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because they were never given the resources they needed to succeed, such that
insufficient assistance was given to struggling families while some truly danger-
ous situations were allowed to slip through the cracks.359
Rapid movement toward permanent termination of parental rights poses a
particular threat to the principle of family integrity because of the frequently
weak grounds on which initial removal decisions are often made. Child remov-
als are often preventive in nature; that is, they are justified on the basis of merely
potential harm to the child without any showing of pre-existing abuse or neglect.
For example, in many jurisdictions, evidence of past or present parental drug use
has justified removal of children independent of any evidence that it has in any
way affected the child's wellbeing. In the late 1990s, for instance, the California
Child Protective Services agency in Sacramento adopted a "zero tolerance" pol-
icy, removing children automatically from any home in which there was any
evidence of drug use, whether past or present.360 Over the course of 18 months,
approximately seven thousand children were removed from their families and
placed in "protective custody holds." About half of these children were never
returned to their parents.361 No showing of actual abuse or neglect of children
was required, and in the vast majority of cases, there was no evidence whatso-
ever that any abuse or neglect had occurred. Participation in drug treatment did
not exempt parents from the removals. Many newborn babies were removed
from their mothers at birth.362 Critics of the policy have argued that the separa-
tions not only devastated parents, but also caused major and traumatic disruption
to the children's lives and development.363
We believe, therefore, that policies such as these pervert the notion of "best
interests of the child." Moreover, these policies also give little or no weight to
parental rights, and may therefore be inconsistent with Supreme Court rulings
establishing a fundamental constitutional right to raise one's children. For ex-
ample, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Supreme Court held the substan-
tive due process protection of the "right to live together as a family" to extend to
grandparents, citing a long line of cases demonstrating that the "constitutional
right of parents to assume a primary role in decisions concerning the raising of
their children" is an "enduring American tradition" that is "basic to the structure
of our society.,,364 In Lyng v. Castillo, the Court clarified the standard for find-
ing a violation of this fundamental right: strict scrutiny would apply to policies
that "directly and substantially interfere with family living arrangements.,,365
359. Roberts, supra note 345, at 67-68.
360. John McCarthy, The CPS Drug Use Dilemma, SACRAMENTO MED., Nov. 1998, at II.




364. 431 U.S. 494, 500, 503 n.12 (1977) (plurality opinion).
365. 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 272 2003
272 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL fA W
2. Balancing Parents' and Children's Interests
[Vol. 21:213
The characterization of the right to live with family members as a funda-
mental right aptly captures the tremendous significance of family ties in peo-
ples' lives. Child removals are frequently traumatic for all concerned. Even
when judicial or administrative application of the best interests test results in the
eventual return of children to their parents, temporary removal in the interim
may cause lasting harm to the children and to the stability of the family relation-
ship, especially if frequent visitation is not allowed during the removal period.
As the European Court of Human Rights has noted in a child removal case, the
"ties between members of a family and the prospects of their successful reunifi-
cation will perforce be weakened if impediments are placed in the way of their
having easy and regular access to each other.,,366 The problem, then, is not the
state's right to remove children per se but the too-hasty resort to removal any
time a child's well-being is at all in doubt-a practice that, indeed, is the official
policy of many child protective services agencies.
The obvious difficulty is that protective services must retain some flexibil-
ity in their decisions to remove children or they will lose their ability to inter-
vene in truly dangerous situations. The challenge, then, is to strike a balance
between the state's (and children's) interest in prevention of abuse and neglect
and the interests of parents and children in staying together. International law,
which recognizes each of these interests, may provide guidance or, indeed, im-
pose obligations regarding the proper balance.
The international obligation of states to refrain from arbitrary or unjustified
interference with the unity and privacy of families does not, of course, prohibit
states from ever separating families. Rather, it simply demands an internation-
ally cognizable justification that overrides the interests supporting family unity.
International law not only recognizes the protection of children's welfare as a
legitimate state interest; it affirmatively obligates states to protect children. In-
deed, the protection of children's best interests is the primary stated objective of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.367 The use of "best interests" lan-
guage in treaties, however, does not by any means imply that the requirements
of international law are exactly coextensive with the best interests standard as
currently interpreted and applied in the United States. The terminology is fairly
open-ended, as demonstrated by the variation in interpretation of the test in the
past several decades in the United States. Indeed, as discussed in Section I, the
best interests standard has been widely criticized internationally for being too
open-ended. Similar criticisms have been voiced in the United States by those
366. Olsson v. Sweden, App. No. 10465/83, II Eur. H.R. Rep. 259, 'I! 81 (1987). In another
case, the ECHR found that "there is a significant danger that a prolonged interruption of contact
between parent and child or too great a gap between visits will undermine any real possibility of
their being helped to surmount the difficulties that have arisen within the family and of the members
of the family being united." Scozzari v. Italy, App. No. 39221/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 243, 'Il 177
(2002).
367. See discussion supra Part I.
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who consider the ill-defined standard to be a poor guide to policy and, worse,
subject to manipulation.368
Moreover, the combination of different international law principles dis-
cussed here suggest that parental and other interests in family integrity deserve
at least some weight in the balance alongside children's interests. Experiences
with application of the best interests test internationally-notably in the Aborig-
inal child removal policies discussed in Section ILA-demonstrate the dangers
of officials exercising unfettered discretion to act on their ideas of the child's
best interests. The test is simply too subjective. Rather, international law
should require that the test be applied against a background presumption against
family separation that may only be overcome by evidence of danger to the
child's welfare.
3. European Court of Human Rights Decisions
International courts have been reluctant to interfere with the decisions of
states with respect to protective removal of children. Nonetheless, some limits
have been imposed. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
provides some interesting contrasts. In Olsson v. Sweden, for example, the
ECHR held that despite the legitimacy of the goals of Sweden's child welfare
policy,
it is an interference of a very serious order to split up a family. Such a step must
be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests of
the child; as the [European] Commission right~ observed, it is not enough that
the child would be better off if placed in care. 69
The balancing test suggested by the Court in this passage was grounded in
the requirement of Article 8 of the European Convention that all interferences
with family life be "necessary in a democratic society" to fulfill one of a list of
enumerated objectives.37o The Court explained that the concept of "necessity"
required both that there be a "pressing social need" and that the solution chosen
be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."371 In Olsson, the Court held
that the protective removal of three children from parents who were believed to
be neglecting them was not in and of itself a violation of Article 8. It held that
protective removals might be appropriate and necessary even in some cases
where no harm had yet been documented, noting that discretion had to be given
to authorities since "it would scarcely be possible to formulate a law to cover
every eventuality.,,372 The Court also placed emphasis on the procedural pro-
tections available to the parents, noting that judicial review safeguards against
the "arbitrary" use of the power of preventive removal.373
368. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 334, at 486, 497 (describing the best interests test as "value-
laden," "poorly defined," and a "vague platitude"); Bartlett, supra note 120, at 303.
369. Olsson, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 259'11 72.
370. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 8.
371. Olsson, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 259'11 67.
372. [d. 'II 62.
373. [d. See also W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9749/82, 10 Eur. H. R. Rep. 29, 'II 64 (1988)
(holding that Article 8's procedural requirements included the involvement of parents in the deci-
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However, the ECHR in Olsson held that the state's actions subsequent to
the removal violated Article 8-placing the three children in separate foster
homes at considerable distance from one another and their parents, allowing
extremely limited visitation, and failing to return the children to their parents
within a reasonable length of time. The Court held that Article 8 required re-
moval to be treated "as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as
circumstances permitted, and any measures of implementation should have been
consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the Olsson family.,,374 Moreover,
ease of administration simply could not justify keeping families separate longer
or more completely than is necessary; "in so fundamental an area as respect for
family life, such considerations cannot be allowed to play more than a secondary
role.,,375
Other ECHR cases have reached similar results. For example, in at least
three fairly recent cases, the Court has again shown deference to a state's deci-
sion to remove children from their families, but still found violations of Article 8
due to lack of visitation opportunities and an inadequate commitment to even-
tual family reunification.376 In Johansen v. Norway, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that reunification must be the ultimate goal of removal policies;377 in
Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, it held that "a measure as radical as the total sever-
ance of contact can be justified only in exceptional circumstances.,,378 Al-
though acknowledging the importance of the "best interests of the child," the
Court in both cases made it clear that parents' rights count too; the child's inter-
ests may outweigh the parents' "depending on their nature and seriousness," and
in particular when the child's "health and development" is at serious risk of
harm.379 Moreover, in Johansen the Court explained the reasoning behind the
different degrees of deference given to state authorities in initial removal deci-
sions, on the one hand, and in their subsequent conduct as well as procedural
protections, on the other. It found that
perceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the
care of children vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on such
factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State intervention in
family affairs and the availability of resources for public measures .... [Also,]
national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons con-
cerned.... It follows from these considerations that the Court's task is not to
substitute itself for the domestic authorities ... but rather to review under the
Convention the decisions that those authorities have taken in the exercise of their
power of appreciation.
sion-making process "to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their
interests").
374. Olsson. 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 'l[ 81.
375. Jd. 'l[ 82.
376. Johansen v. Norway, App. No. 17383/90,23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33 (1996); Scozzari v. Italy,
App. No. 39221/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 243, 'l[ 177 (2002); E.P. v. Italy, App. No. 31127/96,31 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 463 (1999).
377. Johansen, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33 'I 78.
378. Scozzari, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 243 'I 170.
379. Jd. 'l[ 169 (citing Johansen, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33 'l[ 78).
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The margin of appreciation so to be accorded to the competent national authori-
ties will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the
interests at stake. . . . Thus, the Court recognizes that the authorities enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into
care. However, a stricter scrutiny is called for both of any further limitations,
such as restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights and access, and
of any legal safeguards. . . . Such further limitations entail the danger that the
family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively
curtailed.38o
Thus, the differing standards applied by the ECHR are intended to strike a
balance between, on the one hand, deference to states' discretion in areas involv-
ing sensitive cultural issues and to their ability to tailor decisions to a particular
situation, and, on the other, the strong rights of parents and children in eventual
successful reunification as protected by Article 8. The balancing tests in these
cases are probably not ideal; the American child removal situations discussed
above and below demonstrate that significant abuses can happen at the initial
removal stage as well. But there is something important to be said for deference
to state authorities when it comes to decisions that, for children, may sometimes
make a life-or-death difference. One possibility to keep in mind is that interna-
tional courts, given their temporal, physical, and cultural distance from the ac-
tual situations, may be well advised to be more deferential in these situations
than would be national courts reviewing similar decisions. Yet national courts
can, and should, take into account their international obligations as well, and
should do so with heightened vigilance.
4. Incorporating International Law into U.S. Child Welfare Decisions:
Nicholson v. Williams
In the United States, when an international law obligation conflicts with
domestic federal law, United States judges are required to interpret the domestic
law in a way that avoids the conflict if possible; if not, the two have equal status
and the last-in-time rule applies.381 State and local law, however-which com-
prises the great majority of American family law-is trumped by international
law, whether treaty-based or customary.J82 Following this rule, judges must
interpret state and local child welfare laws in a way that conforms to the interna-
tionallegal norms set forth above, and if they conflict unavoidably, the domestic
laws cannot be applied. This clear constitutional principle (grounded in the
Supremacy Clause) notwithstanding, federal and state judges rarely cite interna-
380. Johansen, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33 'lI 64.
381. See supra note 317.
382. See Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 147,
153 (1999) (stating that treaty provisions trump state law); Leslie Wells, A Wolfin Sheep's Clothing:
Why Unocal Should Be Liable Under U.S. Law for Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 35, 57 (1998) (stating that customary international law trumps state law).
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tiona11aw at all in family law cases.383 A recent decision of the Eastern District
of New York, again by Judge Weinstein,384 provides a notable exception. Nich-
olson v. Williams was a class action lawsuit by a group of mothers against the
New York City Administration for Child Services (ACS).385 The lawsuit chal-
lenged ACS's policy of automatically removing children from homes where do-
mestic violence had occurred even if it meant removing them from the victims
rather than the perpetrators of that violence. Pursuant to this policy, an incident
of domestic violence (that is, committed by a man against a mother, not against
her child) would result in ACS citing both parties for "engaging in domestic
violence," with no distinction between abuser and victim.386 Sometimes, in
fact, ACS would cite only the victim and not list the abuser at a11.387 Then the
child would be preemptively taken away from the mother and placed in foster
care. All this would occur absent any showing that either parent, much less the
mother, had committed abuse or neglect of the child. However extraordinary
this policy may sound, New York was not alone in adopting it; indeed, the wide-
spread problem of termination of domestic violence victims' parental rights has
been "well-documented.,,388
The children of the named plaintiffs in Nicholson were kept in foster care
for several weeks. The court cited the emotiomil and developmental damage
done to the children, the destruction of their family relationships, and the disrup-
tion to their schoolwork and daily lives inflicted even by these relatively short-
term placements in foster care. The Nicholson court held that the ACS policy
resulted in "the forcible and unjustified separation of abused mothers and their
children.,,389 Specifically, the court relied on both constitutional and interna-
tional protections of the right to family integrity, with respect to both parents'
and children's rights. The court cited specific international provisions including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the Convention on
the Rights of the Chi1d.390 As to the last, the court, citing Beharry v. Reno,
stated that its protections had the force of customary international law. The
court thus held that the ACS policy violated the basic human rights of family
integrity and freedom from arbitrary interference with family life, as well as the
specific right of a child to be cared for by her parents. Unlike in the immigra-
tion cases discussed in the previous Section, however, in Nicholson the court did
not rely heavily on international law arguments, which were not really used as
independent grounds for the decision. Rather, the court's citations to interna-
383. Cf Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567,
568 (1997) (noting that "the federal government has refused to press the states into conforming"
with international norms in traditionally state-dominated areas including family law).
384. See supra notes 298-319 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Weinstein's decisions
in recent immigration cases).
385. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
386. Id. at 192-93.
387. This, amazingly, occurred in 46.2 percent of cases where ACS cited parents for engaging
in domestic violence. See id. at 209.
388. Venier, supra note 349, at 528.
389. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d. at 168.
390. Id. at 234.
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tional law provided support for the claim that family integrity and privacy are
fundamental rights, interference with which merits heightened scrutiny under the
Constitution.
5. Application of International Norms Governing Family Separation to
the Protective Removal of Children
Protective removal of children provides a difficult case for the formation
and application of international norms governing family separation. Unlike the
Aboriginal child removal policy discussed in Section II.A, the various interna-
tional obligations at stake in this context compete with one another; they pull the
state in opposite directions. Balancing the interests of parents and children in
family integrity against the state's strong interest in protecting children from
abuse can often be difficult, whether one employs principles of international or
domestic law or both. But there are cases in which child protection agencies
have clearly crossed the line, wherever the line may be drawn. The New York
policy at issue in Nicholson, and the Sacramento policy discussed above, are two
such cases. Not only do these policies conflict with United States constitutional
protections of family integrity; they also violate U.S. obligations at international
law.391 The Nicholson case shows that one effective enforcement mechanism
for those obligations is to incorporate them in the rulings of courts reviewing
decisions to remove children.
But how, then, to strike the balance in more marginal cases? This is an
area in which we hope international norms will evolve to incorporate the shared
wisdom of a variety of national experiences. For now, we suggest a few basic
principles. First, there should be a presumption against child removal that can
be overcome only by a showing of parental wrongdoing or some other actual
danger to the child's safety. That is, the state should not remove children simply
because it believes that to do so would be marginally better for the child. Not
only are such judgment calls unreliable predictors of the child's actual best inter-
ests, but they also give too little weight to the fundamental human right of par-
ents to raise their children. Instead, children should generally not be removed
absent a showing of actual (not merely potential) abuse or neglect. As a corol-
lary, children should only be removed for purely preventive purposes (that is,
absent a showing of past harm) if there is a strong reason to believe they are in
imminent and serious danger, and then there should be a hearing as soon as
possible to determine whether this belief is supported. In general, all removal
decisions should be subject to very prompt administrative and judicial review.
Finally, child welfare agencies should never rely on facile assumptions that cer-
tain groups of people are inadequate parents, absent actual showings of harm to
children in specific cases. Blanket policies like those that remove children auto-
matically from domestic violence victims, former drug users, and so forth vio-
late the family's right to individualized decision-making, and set the stage for
391. The actions of state and local governments are imputed to the United States under interna-
tional law. See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 77 AM. J. 1Nr'L. L. 135, 135 (1983).
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"indiscriminate intervention on the basis of current moral panics."392 The
stakes for families are too high to let stereotypes take the place of reasoned
judgments.
. E. Mass Family Separation in Crisis Situations
In each of the case studies discussed above, family separation was imple-
mented pursuant to specific state policies adopted through a legislative or legal
process. But state-enforced separation of families frequently occurs without
such processes and without an official state policy. Families are often forcibly
separated en masse as a result of wars or refugee crises. In this Section, we
analyze the implications of international law for mass family separation in cri-
ses, both when it results from a deliberate state policy that itself constitutes a
major human rights violation (as in mass expulsion campaigns) and when it is an
inadvertent consequence of other types of disaster situations. We argue that
international law places both negative and positive obligations on states in cri-
ses: they must refrain from forcibly separating families and work toward the
reunification of those that have been separated.
Unlike each of the case studies discussed above, family separation is not
necessarily the central element of the wrong that occurs in crisis situations.393
In cases such as mass expulsions or unjust warfare, for example, recognition of a
norm against involuntary family separation is not necessary in order to condemn
the abuses or find a violation of international law. However, analysis of family
separation in many such situations may be useful for at least three reasons.
First, although it may seem "secondary" in terms of international law, family
separation is a central element of the harm many victims of major human rights
abuses experience. People simply care a great deal about their families, and
often suffer more from losing them than they do even from serious individual
harms they suffer personally. Recognition of the impact of family separation
can thus help us to come to a fuller understanding of victims' experience. Sec-
ond, recognition that family separation constitutes an important element of a
particular human rights abuse may affect the choice of remedy for that abuse at
international law. That is, family reunification should be a central element of
any remedy ordered by a court or other international body, or of international
humanitarian relief efforts. Current requirements for, and efforts toward, family
reunification will be discussed further below. Third, family separation deserves
attention because it can increase the likelihood of other human rights abuses
392. VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 87 (arguing that such indiscriminate interventions violate
the principles of the eRC).
393. In the Stolen Generations, polygamy, and child welfare examples, the direct, immediate
intent of the contested policy was to separate families. The motives or ultimate goals of the policies,
of course, differed, ranging from benevolent (child welfare) to malign (cultural destruction); but in
each of the three cases, the state deliberately employed a policy of family separation as a strategy to
accomplish those goals. In the American immigration law case, although family separation was only
a side effect of the state's deportation policy, it was nonetheless the central violation of international
law; the unjustified or arbitrary separation of families made illegal deportations that ordinarily would
have been permined by international law.
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occurring and compounding the initial crisis situation. This is particularly so in
the case of children being separated from their parents, as the discussion of
unaccompanied refugee children below will revea1.394
I. Mass Expulsion
One major cause of widespread separation of families is mass expulsion.
Mass expulsion is widely recognized as a major violation of human rights, con-
travening numerous prohibitions of international law. For example, provisions
in the American Convention on Human Rights and in the African Charter ban
mass expulsion specifically.395 As the African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights has noted, "the drafters of the Charter believed that mass expulsion
presented a special threat to human rights."396 In addition to these specific
prohibitions, mass expulsion violates treaty provisions that provide for procedu-
ral protections for deportees.397 The International Law Association adopted a
Declaration of Principle of International Law on Mass Expulsion in 1986, which
suggested that mass expulsion of nationals might be considered an international
crime and certainly a violation of internationallaw.398 The International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has issued a number of indictments
charging leaders for their roles in the expulsion of thousands of Kosovo Albani-
ans and similar expulsions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between
1991 and 1995.399 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in-
cludes "deportation or forcible transfer of population" as a crime against human-
ity.4°O Despite this international recognition, expulsions remain a serious
problem. For example, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia
and Eritrea in 1998, Ethiopia began a campaign to deport persons of Eritrean
national origin, many of them Ethiopian citizens. Over the next two to three
years, tens of thousands of people were expelled.401 Deportations occurred
394. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 80 (noting that, "when the family is unable to exercise
its primary role in bringing up children, children become more vulnerable to violations of other
fundamental rights").
395. American Convention, supra note 25, art. 22(9); African Charter, supra note 25, art. 12.
396. See Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de I'Homme v. Zambia, African
Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights, 20th Sess., Comm. No. 71/92, 'l[ 40 (1997) (condemning the expul-
sion of 517 West Africans from Zambia); see also Union Inter Africaine v. Angola, African Comm.
Hum. & Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), 22nd Sess., Comm. No. 159/96, 'l[ 15 (1997).
397. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 13; American Convention, supra note 25, art. 22; African
Charter, supra note 25, art. 12.
398. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAc-
TICE 81 (1995).
399. See. e.g., Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Siobodan Milosevic, Indictment, Case IT-99-37,
(May 24, 1999) 'l[ 35, available at http://www.un.orglicty/indictmentlenglishlmil-ii990524e.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2002).
400. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NConf. 183/9 (1998) art. 7
§l(d).
401. See Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Ethiopia, available at http://www.hrw.orgl
wr2kl/africalethiopia.html (last visited Nov. 6. 2002) (stating that Ethiopia had expelled 70,000
people by early 2000). The authors have been, and Prof. Brilmayer remains, actively involved in
advocacy on behalf of deportees from Ethiopia, including preparing claims against Ethiopia for an
international war crimes compensation commission.
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without judicial hearings; frequently people were rounded up at their homes at
gunpoint during the night, thrown in jails or detention camps, and then herded
onto buses for the border.402
Family separation is an inevitable consequence of mass expulsion cam-
paigns. For example, in Union Inter Africaine v. Angola, the African Commis-
sion found that Angola had violated Article 18 of the African Charter by
separating families during a mass expulsion.403 In Ethiopia, separation of fami-
lies was ubiquitous and well documented,404 sometimes because families were
of mixed national origin and those deemed "Ethiopian" were not permitted to
join their deported family members.405 Additionally, more than one thousand
people were detained for months or years at detention camps and thus separated
from their families.406 Beyond the physical, financial, and emotional conse-
quences of forced expulsion, the separation of families caused heightened
trauma for the deportees and those left behind.407 Today, although the war is
over, the border remains closed and ordinary lines of communications cut off;
there is no foreseeable prospect of deportees being allowed to return. Thus,
although some families have been reunited in Eritrea due to succeeding waves of
deportations, for some the separation has been total and is potentially
permanent.
2. Internal Displacement
Internal displacement of populations, particularly in combination with re-
strictions on freedom of movement within a country, may also violate interna-
tional norms against family separation. For example, the European Court of
Human Rights found that Turkey violated Article 8's protections of family life,
and many other provisions of the European Convention, by enacting a systemic
policy designed to displace Greek Cypriots from northern CypruS.408 This pol-
icy included a number of restrictions on freedom of movement between north
and south that "resulted in the enforced separation of families and the denial to
the Greek Cypriot population in the north of the possibility of leading a normal
family life. ,,409 The Court also cited the cutoff of normal lines of communica-
tion as well as surveillance members that made contacts between family mem-
bers, when they did occur, restricted by a surrounding "hostile environment.,,410
402. See Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, DEP'T ST,. BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR Feb. 26, 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/ wwwl
globallhuman_rights/1998_hrp_reportlethiopia.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
403. See Union Inter Africaine, ACHPR, Comm. No. 159/96, 'll 15.
404. See United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Rash Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance
to Eritrea 46, Sept. 1998.
405. See AMNESTY iNTERNATIONAL, ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN A YEAR
OF ARMED CONFLICT, AFR 04/03/99,27, (1999).
406. Id. aI 22, 28.
407. Id.
408. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781194, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 731 (2001).
409. Id. 'll 293.
410. Id. 'll'll 296, 300.
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The situation of the Greek Cypriots parallels that of families separated by
many instances of internal displacement worldwide. As UNHCR has explained,
During the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of peo-
ple who are internally displaced or directly affected by warfare but who do not
cross international borders and do not benefit from the provisions of refugee law.
Many of these people are children who have become separated from their families
or whose parents lost their lives in the conflict.411
As this passage points out, an additional problem for the victims of such
separations is that internally displaced persons may have fewer rights under cur-
rent international law than do refugees. The development of a cohesive interna-
tional norm against involuntary family separation-one that governs states'
conduct generally, not just in situations to which refugee law applies-might
thus offer internally displaced persons a measure of protection that they are cur-
rently denied.
3. Warfare
Family separation is also a frequent consequence of warfare, whether it
results from family members being killed or from internal displacements or refu-
gee migrations. Following wars, families may have a right, protected by the
Geneva Conventions, to information about the fate of missing family members
and, if possible, to reunification.412 Refugee crises in general almost invariably
separate families, and pose a particular threat to children, who are frequently left
entirely alone.413 Minors compose just over half of the refugee population re-
ceiving assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR).414 In 1999, Human Rights Watch documented the situation of many
thousands of Sierra Leonean children living in refugee camps in Guinea.415 Be-
ing left alone subjects refugee children to serious danger, including starvation,
physical and sexual abuse, and labor exploitation.416 A UNHCR report details
some of these risks:
Boys and girls on their own are easy targets for recruitment into armed groups, as
combatants, porters, spies or servants, and they are at high risk of exploitation and
physical or sexual abuse, and even death. Involuntary separation thus increases
the risks faced by the displaced, refugee, and other war-affected children; it can
be more traumatic than the displacement itself.417
411. Report of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees: Assistance to unaccompanied
refugee minors, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess. Agenda Item 108, 'II 5, U.N. Doc. A/53/325 (1998), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/documents/galdocs/53/p1enary/a53-325.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter UNHCR Report].
412. See Vaughn A. Ary, Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Cease-Fire
Agreements, 148 MIL. L. REv. 186,207-10 (1995).
413. See Megan E. Kures, Note, The Effect ofArmed Conflict on Children: The Plight of Unac-
companied Refugee Minors, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 141, 141-44 (2001).
414. [d. at 144.
415. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN OF WAR: SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEE
CHILDREN IN GUINEA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.orglreports/1999/guinea/guine997.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
416. [d.; see also Kures, supra note 413, at 145 (describing "extreme violence" including "mass
rape," as well as other dangers to children's survival and wellbeing).
417. UNHCR Report, supra note 411, at 'II 6.
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Indeed, family separation is emotionally traumatic for refugees of all ages. Ac-
cording to Professors Hathaway and Neve, "[o]ne of the strongest emotional
needs of refugees is to be reunited with close family members.,,418
4. International Legal Obligations in Crisis Situations: Reunification
and Prevention of Separation of Families
Not all fonus of warfare, and not all causes of refugee crises, constitute
violations of international law in and of themselves. But all may raise an inter-
national obligation for states to attempt to minimize family separation, and to
reunify families who have unavoidably been separated. One problem for the
enforcement of existing international nonus against family separation during
times of international or internal crisis is that the relevant international provi-
sions have generally been considered derogable in emergency situations.419
However, at least where no derogation has taken place, countries may already
have an affinuative obligation under international law to prevent and redress the
separation of families in crisis circumstances, particularly when such separations
affect children.
For example, as discussed in Section I, both the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child set
forth detailed provisions regarding reunification measures that must be taken in
refugee or conflict situations.42o In addition, a number of U.N. soft law instru-
ments specifically address the plight of refugee minors. For example, the Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary General on internally displaced persons has
set forth a list of principles that "reaffinu the right of families to remain together
and to be speedily reunited if separated.,,421 The UNHCR Guidelines contain a
number of directives mandating efforts to preserve and restore family unity dur-
ing refugee crises.422 Moreover, the Geneva Convention on the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War mandates that in any war, "the parties to the
conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that children under fifteen,
who are orphaned or are separated from their families as a result of the war, are
not left to their own resources.,,423 Although not prohibiting family separation
per se, this provision obligates states to address the consequences of it. In addi-
tion, the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically mandates that all
member states cooperate in U.N. efforts to reunify families by tracing the family
418. James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant
Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. liS,
163 (1997); id. at 173 (stating that family separation causes "extreme anxiety and fear," and "often
interferes with efforts to become self-sufficient in the asylum country").
419. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 17, at 86 (arguing thai this allowance of derogation weakens
the "protection of the rights of the child at the time when they are most needed").
420. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
421. See UNHCR Report, supra note 411, at 'II II.
422. See Evaluation of UNHCR's Efforts on Behalf of Children and Adolescents, U. N. High
Comm'r for Refugees, U.N. Doc. EVAU06/97 (1997).
423. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 24, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 213 U.N.T.S. 379.
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members of child refugees.424 To date, the U.N. reunification program has been
greatly underutilized.425 Yet reunification efforts can be successful when suffi-
cient resources are devoted to them; for example, in 1997 and 1998, UNHCR,
UNICEF, the Red Cross and other agencies reunited three-quarters of unaccom-
panied Rwandan refugee children in the Congo with their families.426
This case study thus suggests the need for greater international attention to
the impact of wars and major human rights crises on family unity. In terms of
their illegality under intemationallaw, and in terms of the resolution of compet-
ing values and interests, at least most of the cases discussed in this section are
the paradigmatic "easy cases," much like the Stolen Generations case. That is,
there are a number of strong internationally recognized values at stake, all of
them pulling in the same direction: toward condemnation of these situations as
major violations of international law. Yet when the ramifications for families
are taken into account, it becomes evident, if it was not already, that condemna-
tions are not enough; shattered families and children alone in refugee camps will
not be significantly mollified by pronouncements that their treatment was, in-
deed, illegal. Rather, the international community needs to look for solutions.
A paramount concern in responses to crises like these should be the reunification
of families. International law already contains provisions imposing affInnative
obligations on states in this regard; more efforts and resources should be put to
making sure these on-paper commitments are fulfilled in reality.
III.
CONCLUSIONS
The diversity and complexity of the various issues discussed in Section II
suggest that the problem of involuntary family separation does not admit of easy
generalization. To an international lawyer, this may be a discouraging conclu-
sion, for the successful functioning of international law depends on the ability to
generalize-that is, to fashion general rules and principles that can work when
applied to specific situations and cultural contexts. Conflicts of values and in-
terests are inevitable in any area of law; without conflicts, one might say, law
would not be necessary. But conflicts involving the family are especially diffi-
cult to resolve. Passions on the issues run deep, both because of people's strong
feelings for their own families and because many people place great weight on
the cultural values bound up in this central social institution. Moreover, there is
a remarkably low degree of consensus, both between and within cultures, on
basic assumptions such as what constitutes a "family." It is tempting, perhaps,
to conclude that an area this sensitive and contested does not belong in the do-
main of international law at all.
This, of course, is not our conclusion. International law, especially interna-
tional human rights law, often deals with complicated, difficult-to-resolve is-
424. CRC, supra note 12, art.22.
425. Kures, supra note 413, at 158.
426. UNHCR Report, supra note 411, at'lI 15.
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sues, and by its nature must accommodate cultural conflict. Perhaps one of the
reasons the idea of "international family law" seems so problematic is that at
least in the West, attitudes are only beginning to change as to whether and to
what extent family relations are a proper object of national law, or even of law
at all. The wall surrounding the proverbial man's castle is only beginning to
crumble, and its doctrinal foundations are still for the most part in place. But
these doctrines, no less than the meaning of "family," are cultural artifacts that
are subject to transformation. Today, international law increasingly regulates
matters involving the family, as reflected in a wide range of treaty provisions;
there is no turning back. With respect to family separation, the task ahead is to
make sense of and improve upon current international law requirements. We
must construct from today's piecemeal approach a coherent set of substantive
principles and effective procedures that can help to balance the various compet-
ing values and find solutions to the serious human rights concerns confronting
us. We hope the near future will bring a concerted international effort in that
direction. For now, we offer some tentative conclusions drawn from our case
studies:
1. Involuntary family separation is a widespread and serious human
rights concern.
We hope that if nothing else, this article will help to bring into focus a
major problem that affects, we suspect, every country in the world. The forced
separation of families occurs in a variety of contexts-from wars and refugee
crises to immigration and family courts-but in every case, very serious inter-
ests are at stake. The breakup of families is typically devastating to the people
involved and, as the Stolen Generations case makes clear, can have serious
ramifications for societies and cultural groups. Although we know the number
is large, we have no idea how many families are involuntarily broken up world-
wide every year, and this is part of the problem; the international community is
not paying enough attention. Family separation deserves to be treated as a major
human rights issue. It should, accordingly, be incorporated into United Nations
human rights reporting requirements for member states and into the D.N.'s own
fact-finding assessments and those of non-governmental organizations assessing
the human rights situations in particular countries. Protection against involun-
tary family separation should be part of the agenda of international and national
bodies dealing with refugee crises, conflicts, immigration, child protection, gen-
der, racial, and cultural discrimination, and other major human rights concerns.
2. Many instances offamily separation occurring today violate already-
existing international legal requirements and prohibitions.
Although we have described the current state of international law on the
subject of family separation as fragmentary, we do not mean to suggest that it is
insignificant. Rather, we simply mean that there is no cohesive and internally
consistent set of principles addressing the subject of family separation per se.
Instead, a variety of international provisions implicate different aspects of the
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problem, while some aspects are not covered at all. Nevertheless, these existing
provisions do impose substantial limits on state behavior, as well as some af-
firmative state obligations. Furthermore, some of these requirements may enjoy
a sufficient level of consensus that they rise to the level of customary interna-
tionallaw.
In some of the cases we have discussed, we think there is little serious
controversy regarding the existence of international law violations-the Austra-
lian child removal policy, for example, or the crisis situations discussed in Sec-
tion ILE. In other cases, we have deliberately selected situations that fall rather
close to the line in terms of what international law permits, although we think
that each involves some state behavior that crosses that line (or at least the one
that we would draw). We have noted that the "hard cases" are characterized by
conflicts between values and interests that international law properly recog-
nizes-for example, between the rights of parents and the safety of children, or
between the family relationships and economic security of immigrant women
and the right to gender equality for those same women. However, we think
existing international law can help to resolve the conflicts even in these cases.
For example, the recent decisions on family and immigration law by U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Weinstein demonstrate an admirable effort to bring existing interna-
tionallegal principles to bear on a domestic legal system that is ordinarily quite
resistant to international influences.
3. International and domestic courts, and other institutions and
individuals who help to shape and apply international law, should
recognize an international norm against the involuntary separation
offamilies, and should develop specific sets of rules dealing with
family separation in particular contexts.
The significance of this human rights concern is such that today's piece-
meal approach, however helpful, is not enough. We believe that from these
beginnings we can see the outlines of a customary international norm against
family separation taking shape, and we hope that international and domestic
courts and other international law institutions will recognize such a norm in the
future. In addition, we think new treaties, protocols, and soft law instruments
should address family separation in particular contexts in more specific ways-
for example, delineating the procedural and/or substantive rights of immigrants
whose families are divided by national borders. Ultimately, we think it is im-
portant that involuntary family separation be recognized as a violation of inter-
national law in and of itself, not merely a corollary of other human rights
concerns such as privacy or protection of children.
4. This norm should not, however, be considered an absolute rule, but
should be subject to limitations grounded in the need to protect
other internationally recognized human rights.
As we have said repeatedly, the individual, cultural, and social interests
underlying the value of family unity conflict in many circumstances with other
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values and interests that are properly cognizable at international law. Although
experience teaches that balancing tests are often so malleable that they can sup-
port any desired result, the fact is that when legitimate and important interests
conflict there is no alternative but balancing, whether a concretized "test" is
employed or not. At a minimum, we think there should be a clear presumption
that involuntary family separation violates international law. To put this another
way, the existence of involuntary family separation should be considered suffi-
cient to overcome the ordinary baseline presumption of international law-that
the actions of sovereign states are presumptively legitimate. Thus, states should
have to justify separating families.
The adequacy of a state's justification will, of course, depend on the spe-
cific situation. But as a general rule, we think the interests of individuals in
staying together with their families are strong enough that, to borrow language
(if not doctrinal baggage) from United States constitutional law, the competing
interest should be compelling. Sometimes, too, other factors beyond individual
interests-such as the cultural integrity of minority groups-may weigh in favor
of family unity and thus demand an even stronger justification for separation.
Factors that may be considered sufficiently compelling include the safety and
well-being of children and the prevention of gender-based and other forms of
oppression and violence. But mere citation to these interests should not be suffi-
cient; serious scrutiny as to whether family separation is necessary to accom-
plish these ends is required. The history of the application of the "best interests
of the child" standard, as well as the specter of African immigrant women squat-
ting in abandoned Paris apartments, demonstrate that too often, deference to
state authorities' facile determinations regarding what actions are necessary to
serve particular interests ends up hurting the very people the policies were de-
signed to help.
5. This balancing of interests should be conducted in forums that
provide for the meaningful participation of all affected family
members, including all necessary procedural protections.
Judge Weinstein's recent immigration decisions have emphasized the im-
portance of affording a fair hearing where potential deportees can argue for con-
sideration of the impact of family separation, and where immigration authorities
will genuinely weigh this impact against the state interests supporting deporta-
tion.We think that procedural protections such as these are a minimum require-
ment for the acceptability of any state-enforced family separation, not just in the
immigration context but in any context. Due process should be afforded when
fundamental rights are at stake; this is such a core principle of United States law
that it is surprising how routinely it is ignored, as the child welfare case study
shows. International law should and does also recognize this right, and the ex-
isting international customary and conventional due process protections should
be applied consistently in cases of family separation.
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6. Justice within the family is an important objective of international
law; to that end, international norms against family separation
should not be understood to insulate the family from external
scrutiny.
As discussed in Section I, we think it is overly simplistic to jump to the
conclusion that, because violence and injustice often occur within families, the
family is necessarily an institution of violence and injustice and deserves no
legal protection. But we do recognize the serious need for attention, in both
international and domestic law, to issues of human rights within the family, in-
cluding domestic violence and gender inequality. This is one of feminism's
great insights, and today it holds an important place in international law, as the
widespread ratification of CEDAW demonstrates. We think that norms of inter-
national law protecting families from forcible breakup by the state are fully
compatible with a commitment to the individual and structural equality rights of
women and children. In any balancing of interests, this latter commitment
should weigh heavily. But as the polygamy case study demonstrates, sometimes
what seems to be a simple issue of gender inequality does not admit of easy
solutions, and policies that disregard concerns for family integrity can often
have bad results for women. The polygamy case also shows that it is important
to guard against well-intentioned concerns for equality being co-opted, in this
case by xenophobic political forces, to serve anti-equality ends.
* * *
We have in this article explored in some depth only a few cases of involun-
tary separation of families, a widespread problem that has vastly more incarna-
tions and complexities than even this fairly varied sample illustrates. Similarly,
we have drawn from these cases only a few general principles and propositions
regarding the content and application of a legal norm that can only be developed
effectively through international effort informed by international experience.
We hope that more international attention will be paid to this problem in the
future, because the problem of family separation is not going to go away. Some
of the most frequent, yet most difficult to resolve, instances of family separation
occur in the context of immigration and anti-immigration policies. Others result
from wars and refugee crises, or from intra-cultural conflicts, including chang-
ing conceptions of what constitutes a family. We believe that the forces of
globalization, combined with social movements worldwide pushing for and
against rapid cultural transformation, are likely to bring these pressures and ten-
sions into sharper and sharper focus in coming years. If so, the development of
international norms governing family separation will probably become a yet
more complicated task-but one that will be ever more important. The problem
is vast and daunting taken as a whole, and on an individual level makes for
many sad and painful stories. Yet the foundations for a serious international
response to it are in place; we hope the international community rises to the
challenge.
